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Chapter I: Contextualizing the Opioid Crisis in Science and History 
i: Introduction to the Opioid Crisis 
There is hardly an American whose life has not been touched in some way by the tidal 
wave of opioid addiction and overdose deaths currently sweeping the nation. As of 2016, it is 
estimated that there are two million and four hundred thousand Americans living with opioid 
addiction (IMS Institute 2016).  In 2016, approximately eighty percent of the global opioid 
supply was consumed in the United States (Gusovsky 2016). Europe and Canada combined 
consumed fifteen percent, leaving the rest of the world with just five percent of the global opioid 
supply for their use (Gusovsky 2016). Now the U.S. is suffering the consequences of this greed.  
The U.S. has experienced a sharp increases in rates of use, abuse, and dependence of 
prescription opioids, opioid-related emergency department visits, and overdose deaths among all 
age groups in all states (Keyes et al 2014).  
Figure 1. United States Opioid Overdose Deaths, 1999-2015  
The Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation 2017 
Opioid-related mortality rates have been higher among men, non-Hispanic Whites and 




of lower socioeconomic status (King et al 2014). Reported overdose death rates are most likely 
understating the scale of opioid overdose deaths, as this data is obtained from death certificates 
reporting the cause of death as an opioid. Relying on death certificate data is an imperfect 
measure, as the document may fail to name the drug involved in an overdose, leading to 
underestimation of drug-specific overdose rates (Rudd et al 2014). These demographic trends of 
who is most affected by opioid-related mortality and opioid addiction vary by time and by 
specific drug (King et al 2014). In contrast to the late twentieth century characterizations of 
heroin abuse as an inner city problem affecting only poor non white individuals, since around 
2002, cohorts of heroin users entering substance abuse treatment are more likely to be white, 
middle-class, and living in non urban areas. These demographic groups have had the largest 
increases in rates of prescription opioid abuse since the early 2000s (Compton et al 2016). Writer 
Sam Quinones describes the opioid crisis succinctly: “children from the most privileged group in 
the wealthiest country in the history of the world were getting hooked and dying in almost 
epidemic numbers from substances meant to, of all things, numb pain” (Quinones 2015). How 
did we get here? Where do we go from here?  
The increased prevalence of opioid addiction and overdoses has put rising pressure on 
state finances. States bear an increasing share of the burden in paying for substance abuse 
treatment. In 1986, the U.S. spent $9 billion on substance use treatment, paid for equally by 
public and private funds. In more recent years, there has been a shift to a heavier burden on 
public funding, particularly state funding, to pay for substance abuse treatment (Urahn et al 
2015). This shift has been driven in particular by growth in the role of Medicaid and other state 
and local spending, as well as heavy reductions in the role of private insurance (Urahn et al 




the total healthcare costs associated with opioid abuse and misuse, or just two percent of total 
costs. This spending was comprised primarily by state and local expenditures, followed by 
federal and private expenditures (Birnbaum et al 2011). In 2009, the most recent year for which 
data are available, the U.S. spent $24 billion on substance use disorder treatment (for treatment 
for all types of substances). Sixty-nine percent of this funding came from public sources, 
including state and local governments, Medicaid, Medicare, and federal grants. Private health 
insurance and individual out-of-pocket spending accounted for the rest (Urahn et al 2015). In 
2009, state and local funds paid for $7.6 billion, almost a third, of all spending on substance 
abuse treatment. Counting state Medicaid expenditures, state and local spending totaled $9.4 
billion (Urahn et al 2015) in 2009. By 2020, we can expect public spending to represent seventy 
one percent of the total for such treatment, with Medicaid as the single largest source of funding 
(Urahn et al 2015).   
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents the most far-reaching federal intervention 
into the crisis. Under the act, substance abuse treatment was classified as an Essential Health 
Benefit, meaning that all insurance had to cover it. However, access to substance abuse treatment 
treatment still varies dramatically by state and by individual’s insurance and financial 
circumstances. President Trump has declared the opioid crisis a Nationwide Public Health 
Emergency, allowing for expansion of telemedicine services, fast tracking of hiring in the 
Department of Health and Human Services, shifting of treatment resources for HIV/AIDS 
patients, and Department of Labor grants for workers displaced by the opioid addiction. 
President Trump has also established a President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction 
and the Opioid Crisis (The White House 2017). However, these measures don’t provide new 




commitment to working on the opioid addiction epidemic, the Trump administration and the 
Republican leaders of Congress have dedicated themselves to repealing the ACA. Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell first announced it as a top priority on November 9, 2016, and 
then-President Elect Donald Trump first advocated for simultaneous repeal and replace on 
November 13, 2016, early on in the administration (Roubein 2017). It is likely that progress in 
managing the crisis will be greatly curtailed if Congress ever succeeds in repealing and replacing 
the ACA. Therefore, state policies will continue to be the main source of public policy and 
funding for the opioid crisis. As the regulators of health care licensing and practice, states are 
better positioned than federal agencies to monitor and discipline inappropriate and illegal 
prescribing habits (Kenan et al 2012). As such, it is more important than ever to study how and 
why state policy responses to the opioid crisis have come into existence.  
State policy responses to the opioid crisis vary greatly. In 2016, the National Safety 
Council, a nonprofit organization that conducts research and performs public policy lobbying on 
preventing accidental deaths, released a report on the opioid crisis entitled “Prescription Nation 
2016.” The report provides an illustrative snapshot of the intense variation in state policy 
responses to the opioid crisis by evaluating which states have complied with its six policy 
recommendations for state-level actions to address the opioid crisis: implementing mandatory 
prescriber education and opioid prescribing guidelines, the elimination of pain management 
clinics, the creation of prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), increasing access to the 
overdose reversal drug naloxone, and increasing availability of substance abuse treatment 






Table 1. Variation in Implementation of the  Policies Recommended by the NSC, 2016  
0 Policies 
 






















New Jersey  






















North Carolina  
Ohio  








National Safety Council 2016 
 
The New England region (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont) illustrates the variation in state policy responses to the opioid crisis 
particularly well. The size of the economies relative to the rest of the country's, racial and age 
population demographics, and geography of the six New England states are all fairly similar, and 





















Figure 3: U.S. And New England Prescription Opioid Overdose Death Rates per 100,000 
Population (Age-Adjusted), 1999-2016 





Figure 4: New England Prescription Opioid Overdose Deaths, 1999-2015 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
 
Despite these similarities, different policy responses and levels of policy response to the 
opioid crisis have emerged: 













This thesis seeks to understand why policy responses to the opioid crisis vary even in a 
geographically compact region like New England. What accounts for variation in state policy 
responses to the opioid crisis in New England states? I argue that the variation of New England 
state policy responses to the opioid epidemic can be partially explained by the prioritization of 
the issue by state governors. I contend that there is a positive relationship between a governor’s 
prioritization of the opioid crisis within in his or her policy agenda, and the percentage of the 
state budget allocated for opioid crisis response programs and policy initiatives.  
ii: How Do Opioids Work? 
To fully grasp the extent of this crisis and the challenges it poses to New England state 
governments, one must first understand of the neurobiology of how opioids function in the body, 
what makes them so addictive, and the history of their use. In layman’s terms, “opioid” typically 
refers to the final pill or powder form of opioid drugs, but the scientific use of this term does not 
solely refer to prescription painkiller medications or heroin. Rather, the term “opioid” refers to 
any compound that binds to and activates certain proteins, called receptors, located in the 
membranes in certain nerve cells. There are several types of receptors, and opioids primarily act 
upon the mu opioid receptors, which are involved in pain management and are located both in 
the central nervous system (the brain and spinal cord) and in the peripheral nervous system (the 
nerves spread throughout the body) (Rosenblum et al 2008). These receptors exist in our bodies 
for endorphins to bind to. Endorphins are chemicals released in the brain to dull pain, and are 
endogenous (meaning internally produced) opioids (Rosenblum et al 2008). When endorphins 
activate the mu receptors, dopamine is released, reducing the sensation of pain. Exogenous 
(meaning not produced in the body) opioids mimic endorphins, and compete with them to attach 




flood of dopamine to the system, causing intense feelings of euphoria that cannot be matched by 
the dopamine response associated with endorphins. 
 As seen below in Figure 6, the broad category of “opioids” includes opium, which is 
derived from the poppy flower, opium alkaloids, which are isolated from opium (such as 
morphine and codeine), semisynthetic opioids, which are partially derived from opium and 
partially derived from synthetic additives (such as heroin, buprenorphine, and oxycodone), and 
synthetic opioids, which are completely synthetically produced (such as methadone and fentanyl) 
(The National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, n.d.). 
Figure 6. Categories of Opioids 
 
Medical and law enforcement professionals use varied terms to refer to opioids of 




severity, many of these terms have entered the common lexicon and are often used 
interchangeably and incorrectly. However, these terms have specific meanings that must be 
unpacked to bring clarity to the myriad ways in which medical professionals, law enforcement, 
and even politicians talk about the crisis. The term “narcotic” is not a medical term but rather a 
legal designation denoting an opioid painkiller for law enforcement purposes (Rosenblum et al 
2008). Historically, the term “opiate” referred only to naturally occurring endogenous drugs 
derived from the poppy and opium, while the term “opioid” was used to refer to all compounds 
that bind to mu receptors, endogenous opioids and exogenous alike (Rosenblum et al 2008). 
Now, using both terms to make a designation between synthetic and non-synthetically produced 
exogenous opioids has fallen out of favor in the medical community as of late, and using 
“opioid” to refer to either type of exogenous opioid is more common (Rosenblum et al 2008). 
One may also hear of opioid painkillers referred to as opioid “analgesics,” a term referring to 
painkilling properties. For simplicity’s sake, I will be using the term “opioid” throughout this 
thesis, which should be interpreted to refer to all exogenous opioids regardless of synthetic or 
nonsynthetic origin. When referring to both endogenous opioids and exogenous opioids at once, 
I will specify by stating “opioids and endorphins” or similar. When discussing only prescription 
opioid medications, I will clarify by using the addition of the word prescription, but when 
referring to both illegal opioid drugs and prescription opioids at once, I will use the term 
“opioids.”  
iii: How and Why Are Opioids Addictive?  
Physiologically speaking opioids are a central nervous system depressant, meaning that in 
addition to stopping pain, they release, to varying degrees, a calming sensation that makes the 




n.d.). The National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment website describes the 
high that can be obtained from opioids as feelings of  “intense joy and comfort, more so than can 
be obtained naturally. It is similar to feelings of great accomplishment, or achievement of a 
lifetime goal, rather than an impairment.” This is the euphoric feeling that one can begin to crave 
upon repeated exposure, as nothing in real life begins to live up to the emotional or physical 
expectations that the drug has created for the nervous system (The National Alliance of 
Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, n.d.).  
Chronic use of opioids leaves individuals at risk for opioid induced hyperalgesia, reduced 
tolerance to the drugs, and addiction (Sprouse-Blume et al 2010). Hyperalgesia is the increased 
sensitivity to pain stimuli. If someone takes opioid painkillers to manage their pain for long 
periods of time, it is likely that they will become more and more sensitive to feeling pain, thus 
requiring more medication (Volkow et al 2016). The same initial level of pain will feel worse, 
requiring increased dosage to combat the pain, even up to ten times the original dose for some 
(Volkow et al 2016). Long term repeat usage of opioid painkillers may also reduce one’s 
tolerance to opioids, meaning that patients begin requiring more and more of an opioid to reach 
the same level of pain relief. This process is still being studied, but is thought to occur when the 
brain responds to long term opioid use by producing anti-opioid peptides which bind to the mu 
receptors and make them less susceptible to the effects of opioids. Thus, more of an opioid drug 
is necessary to maintain the same degree of dopamine response (Sprouse-Blume et al 2010).  
Mu receptors are also linked to the structures deep in the brain that control reinforcement 
and reward mechanisms, mood, and stress (Rosenblum et al 2008). This link puts users at risk of 
addiction, defined as “a brain disease resulting in a loss of control over drug taking or in 




activation of certain pathways in the central nervous system causes a positive reinforcement 
process, euphoria, when the molecules first bind to the mu receptors, and then a negative 
reinforcement mechanism, dysphoria, when the user experiences a deep emotional and 
physiological crash as the effects wear off (Rosenblum et al; Kolodny et al). The physical 
sensations of withdrawal, which can be uncomfortable at first and then intensely intolerable, 
include severe nausea and vomiting, anxiety, hot or cold flashes, intense sweating, and a rapid or 
irregular heartbeat. Over time, the user’s previously existing motivational pathways may be 
replaced by the emotional and physical craving of the drug to stave off the uncomfortable 
withdrawal and release dopamine to regulate the mood of the user (Sprouse-Blume et al 2010). 
The long term use of opioids suppresses the body’s production of endogenous opioids, creating 
less competition between endorphins and the used drugs, and suppresses the production of mu 
receptors, meaning there are no new receptors created to reduce competition between opioids and 
endorphins (Sprouse-Blume et al 2010). Both processes inhibit the user’s capacity to experience 
the positive feelings associated with dopamine without the use of opioids to jumpstart dopamine 
release. The long term use of opioids can structurally and functionally change the parts of the 
brain that handle rewards and motivations, creating a reliance on opioids to modulate emotional 
and physical wellbeing (Kolodny et al 2015). 
Changes in reinforcement and reward mechanisms leading to addiction do not happen for 
all who are exposed to opioids (Rosenblum et al 2008). Some research indicates that addiction 
occurs in only a small percentage of those exposed to opioids (Volkow et al 2016). For many 
people who take opioids to control acute pain over extended periods of time, there are apparently 
no overt long term effects on these reinforcement and rewards pathways, and many individuals 




addiction among those taking opioid medications in the short-term, typically defined as ninety 
days after a surgical procedure or injury (Shah et al 2017; Sun et al 2016). However, many 
common surgical procedures are associated with patterns of of chronic opioid use past this period 
(Sun et al 2016). Researchers believe that certain individuals may be more susceptible to 
addiction than others, but there isn’t a clear consensus yet. The biological determinants of 
susceptibility to opioid addiction are still being studied (Rosenblum et al 2008). Recent medical 
professional prescribing guidelines still conclude that long-term use of opioid medications can be 
effective for patients who are carefully selected and monitored throughout their exposure to 
opioids (Chou et al 2009).  
Certain populations have a higher risk for developing opioid addiction and suffering an 
overdose due to behaviors and demographic characteristics (Keyes et al 2014). King et al (2014) 
identified six ways in which the behaviors and traits of opioid painkiller users may contribute to 
increased opioid-related mortality: through diversion, doctor or pharmacy shopping, polydrug 
use (i.e., using multiple drugs in addition to opioids, resulting in fatal drug interactions), drug 
substitution, sociodemographic characteristics, and a history of substance abuse. The presence of 
any or many of these six factors potentially increases an individual's’ risk of opioid-related death 
(King et al 2016). Environmental factors such as economic deprivation, inequality, and structural 
discrimination, and social factors such as family composition, peer influence, and stress may be 
risk factors for drug use (Keyes et al 2014). Endogenous factors such as each individual’s genetic 
vulnerability, neurobiological factors, pharmacological sensitivity, personality traits, psychiatric 
morbidity, gender, and age also have a strong influence on one’s likelihood to use, misuse, and 




such as race and ethnicity with drug use remain unexplained, but Black and Hispanic individuals 
have lower overall rates of nonmedical prescription opioid use (Keyes et al 2014).  
Geographical context also shapes risk of drug use (Keyes et al 2014). While availability 
of prescription opioids has increased all over the country regardless of rural/urban status, there is 
evidence that these medications have become more available in rural areas more so than in urban 
areas (Keyes et al 2014). Individuals residing outside of metropolitan areas have higher rates of 
drug poisoning deaths in general, and higher rates of deaths from opioids specifically (Keyes et 
al 2014). Opioid overdoses have increased at a rate more than three times as high in 
nonmetropolitan counties than in metropolitan counties (Keyes et al 2014). Prescription opioid 
related deaths are higher in rural areas even after adjustments for population density have been 
made (Keyes et al 2014). The ratio of recreational to medical users of prescription opioids is 
higher in rural areas as well (Keyes et al 2014). Rural populations are on average older than 
urban populations, and thus rural populations might have greater instances of chronic pain. Areas 
with an older workforce have less new economic infrastructure, and adverse economic 
conditions and high unemployment rates may contribute to greater risk of drug use (Keyes et al 
2014). Rural areas have faced job sector and industry shifts, leading to economic deprivation, 
high rates of unemployment, and fewer opportunities for high-paying stable jobs (Keyes et al 
2014). There is also evidence that chronic pain and injury are more common in rural areas than 
urban areas (Keyes et al 2014). Rural areas may therefore have more individuals being treated 
with prescription opioids (Keyes et al 2014), potentially granting more opportunity for diversion 
from friends and family. 
Young adults who stay in economically deprived areas may have a greater accumulation 




rates more than doubled in every New England county, and not just the rural ones (Monnat 
2016). But in 2014, the counties with the highest overdose rates also had rates of poverty, 
disability, and unemployment that exceed New England averages, and above-average declines in 
manufacturing and manual-labor occupations since 1970 (Monnat 2016):  
Figure 7: Comparison of Drug Overdose Deaths per 100,000 in 2002 and 2014 by New England 
Counties 
       Bissett 2016 
iv: How Do Opioid Overdoses Happen? 
Opioids slow down mental function, creating an altered level of consciousness that leaves 
the user woozy and disoriented, and in large enough quantities can suppress the central nervous 
system so much that the user loses consciousness. Opioids act upon the brainstem, which 




the person's breathing down so much that they enter respiratory distress, and eventually 
respiratory arrest. The person will become apnic, meaning that they are no longer breathing, and 
then hypoxic, meaning that they are not receiving enough oxygen due to poor circulation causing 
a lack of gas exchange at the cellular level. An affected individual will also have highly 
constricted pupils that are unresponsive to light and may be cyanotic, meaning their face will 
turn blue from a lack of oxygen. As the tissues of the heart does not receive enough oxygen, the 
affected individual will enter cardiac arrest, and effectively die. 
v: Overdose Reversal 
The first lifesaving treatment provided to an overdose patient is to try to regain 
respiratory function using CPR and ventilatory support from a bag valve mask. If first responders 
cannot get the patient to breathe again using ventilation alone, the drug naloxone is used to 
restore breathing function and circulation in those suffering respiratory arrest and cardiac arrest. 
Naloxone is commonly thought of as the drug given to bring people back to consciousness, but it 
merely functions to restore breathing function. The opioids discussed in section iii are agonist 
drugs, meaning that they bind to and activate certain receptors in the brain (in this case, the mu 
receptors). In contrast, naloxone is an antagonist drug, meaning it binds to a receptor without 
activating it and reverses the effects of the agonist drug. When naloxone is administered to a 
patient, it binds to the mu receptors, removing and blocking the opioid agonist molecules from 
the mu receptors. Once it has bound to an opioid receptor in place of the opioid agonist, 
naloxone does not signal the receptor to release dopamine, like an opioid agonist would. Instead, 
its presence stops the depression of respiratory function that has taken place in response to the 
opioid agonist already present in the user’s nervous system. It can take multiple doses of 




person has overdosed on a large enough quantity of opioids or has not been breathing for a very 
long time, attempts to use naloxone to revive respiratory effort will most likely be unsuccessful. 
Naloxone can administered through a vein, a bone, a muscle, into the layer between skin and 
muscle, or through the nose. Naloxone is the generic name, but it is better known as the brand 
names Narcan, a canister with a spray nozzle that is administered nasally to to a patient, or Ezvio,  
an auto-injection device that is administered to the upper thigh (National Institute on Drug Abuse 
2016).  
vi: Introduction to the History of Opioids 
In addition to grasping the science behind opioids, we must also understand the history of 
opioid use and abuse globally and specifically in the United States before we can address the 
current opioid crisis and its implications for state policy. This section traces the history of 
humanity’s relationship to opioids, the research and regulatory factors contributing to increased 
availability of prescription opioids in the past twenty years, and the subsequent increased 
prevalence of heroin in the late 2000’s.  
vii: The Global History of Opioid Use and Abuse 
Humanity’s first opioid was opium, which is harvested from the unripe seed pods of the 
poppy flower and has been used medicinally and recreationally for at least two thousand years by 
many different cultures. Opium was brought to Europe and Asia from the Middle Eastern region 
in the sixteenth century, where it flourished as both a medication and a recreational drug. 
Throughout the following centuries many medicines, such as a laudanum, contained opium. The 
mechanisms behind most diseases weren’t understood and there were few true cures available for 
many maladies (Kolodny et al 2015). Opioids seemingly miraculously took away pain, which 




from opium and pharmaceutical companies began producing them as standalone medicines, 
which became heavily prescribed by doctors for even minor issues, leaving many patients 
addicted. In some ways, today’s opioid addiction epidemic is history repeating itself. Between 
the 1840s and 1900, American opioid consumption rose 538% (Kolodny et al 2015).  
Scientists began searching for an opiate that would deliver the same relief from pain 
without addictive properties (Melzack 1990). Heroin was originally thought to be non-habit 
forming when it was first developed as a medication by Bayer Pharmaceuticals in 1898, but its 
addictive qualities soon became apparent as doctors found themselves dealing with a rash of 
heroin addicts. Heroin was subsequently outlawed in the U.S. in 1924. Other painkillers such as 
aspirin were developed during this period as a safer solution to pain management (Kolodny et al 
2015). But even as the causes of many painful diseases became better understood and medical 
cures advanced, and doctors stopped prescribing them as liberally, opiates did not disappear. 
Morphine continued to be used for patients with severe pain as a result of terminal illnesses like 
cancer, and for hospice care. Heroin continued to be abused, looming large in the country’s 
collective consciousness as a perceived singularly inner-city problem throughout the 20th 
century. Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, various synthetic opioid medications were 
introduced to treat acute pain after surgery.   
Doctors were concerned about the risks of addiction and were often hesitant to prescribe 
opioids, leading to what some would later claim was undertreatment of pain in patients with 
cancer, acute disorders, and chronic pain due to the belief that the risk of addiction far 
outweighed the benefits of pain management (Rosenblum et al 2008). Chronic pain, typically 
defined as pain that persists for at least three months, became a key player in the healthcare 




social costs, which include inability to perform responsibilities at home, work, and school, social 
isolation, poor sleep habits, and frequent health care utilization, all contributing to loss of 
economic and social productivity (Rosenblum et al 2008). The medical community clamored for 
treatment options (Rosenblum et al 2008). Beginning in the 1980’s, providers interested in 
searching for solutions to chronic pain were influenced by several seminal studies on opioid use 
and abuse.  
Several groundbreaking studies proposed opioids as the solution to chronic pain, 
beginning in 1980 when researchers Jane Porter and Dr. Hershel Jick published a five sentence 
letter in the New England Journal of Medicine announcing that their analysis of over eleven 
thousand hospital patients treated with opioids found only four cases of addiction (Jick and 
Porter 1980. They concluded that “the development of addiction is rare in medical patients with 
no history of addiction" (Jick and Porter 1980) In 1986, Dr. Russel Portenoy, a highly influential 
pain management specialist who was particularly vocal about the need for opioids in chronic 
pain management practices, and his associate Kathleen Foley published a study reporting low 
instances of opioid addiction among small groups of patients with cancer and other serious 
illnesses (Sarpatwari et al 2017). However, they hadn’t performed any long-term controlled 
studies of opioids for chronic pain; their work focused on using opioids to treat acute pain in 
surgical, burn, and cancer patients (Sarpatwari et al 2017). Yet Portenoy and Foley suggested 
that active involvement of a physician alone was enough to ensure successful treatment 
(Portenoy 1986). Portenoy personally declared that the risk of addiction to opioids was a medical 
myth and called the lack of pain treatment in hospitals “absolutely medieval” (Sarpatwari et al 
2017). He suggested that opioids could and should be used for long periods of time with few side 




These influential articles provided evidence not only for physicians to change their prescribing 
habits, but created a feedback cycle in which other academic works cited these articles to further 
their conclusions downplaying the risk of opioid addiction, which were then cited in further 
studies as evidence that opioid use for chronic pain management was safer than we now know it 
to be. Many influential experimental designs were misaligned with the goal of determining the 
long term risks of opioid addiction, leading to an overconfidence in the safety of opioids that 
continues to haunt the medical community decades later. A 2017 review of the citations of the 
Porter and Jick letter in later New England Journal of Medicine articles revealed that the letter 
had been cited 608 times, with roughly seventy two percent of authors using it as evidence that 
addiction was rare in patients treated with opioids and eighty percent of authors failing to 
accurately explain the terms of the study (Leung et al 2017).  
In 1990, Ronald Melzack published an influential article advocating for increased 
attention from the medical community to chronic pain, citing the Portenoy and Foley (1986) as 
well as the Porter and Jick (1980) to report that morphine use poses little risk of addiction when 
properly managed. Drawing on the “strength” of his study and similar studies, the American Pain 
Society introduced the “Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign” campaign in 1995, urging healthcare 
professionals to assign to pain the same importance as the other vital signs: blood pressure, 
temperature, heart rate, and respiration (Rosenblum et al 2008). The campaign encouraged the 
monitoring of patient’s pain levels during care as a vital indicator of a patient’s condition 
(Rosenblum et al 2008). The Veterans Affairs system, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizers (which accredits hospitals and health care facilities) and the American 
Academy of Pain Medicine joined the American Pain Society in asking for more aggressive use 




Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizers created pain management standards that 
hospitals and outpatient facilities would need to meet for certification, which the VA supported 
and implemented (Sarpatwari et al 2017). In 1997, American Pain Society and American 
Academy of Pain Medicine released a joint statement declaring that the risk of opioid addiction 
for patients without a history of substance abuse was low (Sarpatwari et al 2017). The 2000 best 
practices guidelines from the American Medical Association’s Council on Scientific Affairs 
echoed this statement, and the Federation of State Medical Boards declared that using opioid 
painkillers may be essential in treating chronic pain (Sarpatwari et al 2017). As a result of the 
push for the use of opioids to treat chronic pain, the use of opioid medications became more 
common and was encouraged in many clinical guidelines (Rosenblum et al 2008). Much of the 
blame for the opioid addiction crisis we face today has been levied against the pharmaceutical 
companies developing and advertising prescription opioid painkillers throughout the 1990’s and 
2000’s. But they did not single handedly create today’s opioids addiction crisis, rather, they 
exploited the medical community’s pre-existing, highly publicized demand for solutions for 
chronic pain management.  
viii: The Beginnings of a Crisis 
In 1972, Purdue Pharma developed a formula to slow down the release of a pill’s active 
ingredient into the bloodstream over several hours. Purdue named it Contin, and first used the 
extended-release formula with morphine in the drug MS Contin, which became Purdue’s most 
profitable drug (Sarpatwari et al 2017).  Internal documents gathered from the company in the 
course of various investigations show that when the patent for MS Contin was set to expire, 
which would permit generics to enter the market and reduce Purdue’s market share and profits, 




moneymaker (Sarpatwari et al 2017). Purdue decided on oxycodone, which was originally 
synthesized in Germany in 1916, so the original patent had long expired (Bourdet 2012). There 
were oxycodone drugs on the market already, like Percocet and Percodan. Purdue added the 
extended-release Contin formula to pure oxycodone so that the pain killing effects of the 
oxycodone would be slowly released over a longer period of time, which the company claimed to 
be twelve hours (Keefe 2017, Ryan et al 2016). They called the extended-release oxycodone 
drug “OxyContin.” It was different than the oxycodone medications already on the market as it 
had a higher amount in of oxycodone in each pill to account for the extended time-release (Meier 
2017). This made it almost twice as strong as morphine (Keefe 2017). It was granted a patent in 
1993, arguably as a result of low standards for patenting as oxycodone wasn’t new, only the 
extended release properties of OxyContin were (Sarpatwari et al 2017). Purdue now possessed a 
twenty year period of exclusive manufacturing and selling rights (Foley 2017). The deadline 
incentivized high levels of marketing during this period of market exclusivity (Sarpatwari et al 
2017).  The FDA approved the drug in 1995, and OxyContin hit the market in 1996. Purdue 
began marketing it for long term use for noncancer pain in addition to the more traditional use of 
opioids to treat acute injury, surgical, and cancer pain. 
The game-changing claim Purdue made with OxyContin was that a single dose provided 
pain relief for twelve hours, twice as long as other painkillers on the market (Sarpatwari et al 
2017). Purdue claimed that this was true for over ninety percent of patients (Sarpatwari et al 
2017). However, a 2016 Los Angeles Times investigation uncovered that Purdue was aware that 
these claims were false, upon review of three decades of confidential internal emails, memos, 
meeting minutes and sales reports, and sworn testimony by executives, sales reps and other 




trial records showed that patients weren’t getting the promised twelve hours of pain relief (Ryan 
et al 2016). The first clinical trial of OxyContin, designed and overseen by Purdue scientists and 
paid for by the company as part of the application process for FDA approval, involved ninety 
women with no history of opioid medication use who were given a dose of OxyContin after 
gynecological and abdominal surgeries, while control groups were given other short-acting 
painkillers or placebos. According to a later FDA analysis of the study, more than a third of the 
women who received OxyContin had pain return within the first eight hours, and half required 
another dose before twelve hours were up (Ryan et al 2016). But the study went on to claim that 
OxyContin was “safe, relieved pain and lasted longer than the short-acting painkillers” (Ryan et 
al 2016). Purdue continually received reports from doctors, sales representatives, and 
independent researchers that patients weren’t free from pain for twelve hours. Because 
“OxyContin’s market dominance and its high price — up to hundreds of dollars per bottle — 
hinge on its 12-hour duration. Without that, it offers little advantage over less expensive 
painkillers,” the company continued to market the drug on the basis of twice-daily dosing to 
protect its profits (Ryan et al 2016). 
The other major thrust of Purdue’s marketing of OxyContin was the claim that the drug 
had a risk of addiction of less than one percent (Van Zee 2009). When first released, the 
OxyContin pills came with a package insert claiming that it was actually safer in this regard than 
other painkillers (Keefe 2017) as “delayed absorption, as provided by OxyContin® tablets, is 
believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug” (Cicero et al 2005). At the time, Purdue had run 
no clinical studies on the addiction risk of OxyContin (Cicero et al 2005). This claim came from 
older clinical trials suggesting that, in general, delayed release mechanism drugs were less likely 




studies that found low or no rates of addiction among patients treated with opioids, such as 
Portenoy and Foley (1986) (Cicero et al 2015). But the patients in many of these studies were 
suffering from acute pain, and were not taking opioids daily for long periods of time to manage 
chronic pain. Their cases were poor comparisons for evaluating the addiction risk present for the 
chronic pain patients that Purdue was targeting. A 1999 Purdue-funded study revealed that the 
rate of addiction in patients taking OxyContin was closer to thirteen percent (Keefe 2017).  
To directly market OxyContin to doctors, the company advertised in medical journals, 
produced splashy promotional videos, and handed out OxyContin-branded merchandise to 
doctors (Keefe 2017). Purdue doubled its number of sales representatives, who paid personal 
visits and treated doctors to conferences, dinners, and gifts in exchange for prescribing 
OxyContin (Ryan et al 2016). Sales representatives were later found to have fabricated phony 
scientific charts and to have hidden certain findings about the drug’s addictive effects from 
doctors (Bourdet 2012). Purdue maintained extensive records on the prescribing habits of 
doctors, with the explicit goal of identifying primary care physicians who would expand the 
company’s OxyContin prescribing base (United States General Accounting Office 2003). 
Between 1996 and 2000, the number of Purdue sales representatives grew from 318 to 671, and 
its physician contact list grew from between 33,400 to 44,500 to between 70,500 to 94,000 (Van 
Zee 2009). Purdue’s records indicated that by 2003 nearly half of doctors prescribing OxyContin 
were primary care physicians, who were often not well trained in pain management or addiction 
detection, and also had less follow-up contact time with patients (Van Zee 2009).  
During the first years of OxyContin’s presence on the market, there were no industry or 




2003).1 Nontheless, these advertising methods were so extreme and out of the ordinary at the 
time that a 2003 investigation by the Drug Enforcement Administration concluded that Purdue’s 
“aggressive methods” had “very much exacerbated OxyContin’s widespread abuse” (Keefe 
2017). Depending on estimates, Purdue spent six to twelve times more on marketing OxyContin 
than competitor Janssen Pharmaceuticals spent on marketing a competing fentanyl medication 
(Sarpatwari et al 2017).  
In addition to marketing directly to doctors, Purdue launched more than twenty thousand 
advertising campaigns for the long term use of prescription opioids for noncancer pain between 
1996 and 2002 (Kolodny et al 2015). The company threw financial support behind organizations 
like the American Pain Society, the American Academy of Pain Medicine, the Federation of 
State Medical Boards, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizers in 
exchange for the organizations’ continued advocacy for the treatment of pain using prescription 
opioids (Kolodny et al 2015). The medical community became overenthusiastic in prescribing 
opioids, in some ways understandably. Prescription opioids offered an attractive solution to the 
complicated problem of chronic pain. There were (and still are) few non-pharmaceutical 
approaches to managing chronic pain, and even fewer non-pharmaceutical approaches that health 
insurance companies were willing to cover (Meldrum 2016).  
By 2001, OxyContin was the most frequently prescribed brand-name opioid in the United 
States for treating moderate to severe pain, even though it was never clinically shown to be a 
more effective medication than other opioid painkillers (Van Zee 2009). OxyContin became 
                                                
1 As of 2003, there are voluntary guidelines for how drug companies should market and promote their products to 
federal healthcare programs and to healthcare professionals from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) and the Department of Health and Human Service's Office of Inspector General (United States 




Purdue’s main product, accounting for ninety percent of the company’s total prescription drug 
sales by 2001 (United States General Accounting Office 2003): 
Table 2: OxyContin Sales, 1996-2002 
United States General Accounting Office 2003  
 
The popularity of all opioid medications grew beginning in the late 1990’s. Sales of 
prescription opioid medications including Vicodin, Percocet, and OxyContin quadrupled 
between 1999 and 2010 (Gounder 2013). Between 2000 and 2009, the number of opioid 
prescriptions per one hundred persons rose from nearly sixty two to nearly eighty four, an 
increase of over thirty five percent (Kenan et al 2012). In addition to the increase in the number 
of prescriptions in this period, the size of the prescriptions for oxycodone and hydrocodone also 
increased drastically (Kenan et al 2012). If patients taking OxyContin complained of pain 
breakthroughs closer to eight hours than the Purdue-recommended twelve hours, prescribers 
were told to prescribe stronger rather than more frequent doses to manage both their pain (Ryan 
et al 2016). This pattern of extreme highs and extreme lows inherent in stronger dosing greatly 
increased the patient’s risk for addiction, especially when taking the drug for long periods of 




King et al (2014) identified five ways in which the behavior of prescribers may have 
contributed to increases in opioid related mortality: prescribing large quantities of opioids, 
prescribing high doses of opioids, prescribing oxycodone medications specifically (recall that 
OxyContin is oxycodone), prescribing methadone, and prescribing at high volumes (King et al 
2014). Prescribing habits have larger ripple effects within communities than affecting just the 
individual patients. OxyContin developed a reputation as an easy to get, easy to use recreational 
drug. As prescription medications are viewed as safe and legitimate, and lack the stigma of 
illegal drugs, individuals may be more likely to be experimenting with recreational drug use with 
prescription drugs (King et al 2014). As opioid prescribing for pain management became more 
commonplace, many people had increased opportunities to view and understand the effectiveness 
of the prescription drugs from friends and family members (Keyes et al 2014). Many recreational 
users were first exposed to OxyContin or other painkillers by stealing from friends or family 
members, which is the most common form of diversion of opioid medications (Volkow et al 
2016; Keyes et al 2014).  Individuals who have never received a prescription for a prescription 
opioid account for a substantial proportion of overdose deaths and emergency department visits 
(Keyes et al 2014).  
Anyone interested in taking OxyContin recreationally could learn how to do so just by 
reading the instruction manual, which warned that “taking broken, chewed or crushed OxyContin 
tablets could lead to the rapid release and absorption of a potentially toxic dose” (Keefe 2017). 
To break down the extended-release mechanism of the pill and deliver a huge high all at once, 
the pills could be crushed into a powder for snorting, or dissolved in liquid for injection (Keefe 




release mechanisms of the pills, or that these forms of misuse would be become widespread 
(United States General Accounting Office 2003).  
As the popularity of recreational use of the drug grew, a black market developed, aided 
by “pill mills,” high-volume clinics (Keyes et al 2014) operated by medical professionals with 
varying degrees of licensure to make a profit solely off of prescribing opioids (Keefe 2017). 
These prescribers were willing to offer opioid prescriptions without much patient contact, 
making them the perfect targets for “doctor shopping” either for resale or for personal use, in 
which the same individual obtains multiple prescriptions, each from a different doctor who is 
unaware of the existence of the others (Volkow et al 2016). 
Increasing trends of recreational use, illicit prescribing, and diversion of opioids failed to 
turn up in the FDA systems responsible for monitoring nationwide use and suspected abuse of 
drugs. At the same time, the FDA was realizing independently of the opioid problem that these 
systems weren’t strong enough to detect isolated adverse events before they evolved into large 
scale public health problems (Cicero et al 2005). Between 1993 and 2001, drug recalls increased 
dramatically: over one and half percent of drugs approved between 1993 and 1996, and over five 
percent of drugs approved between 1997 and 2001 were recalled (Cicero et al 2005). In response, 
the FDA implemented a task force in 1999, which concluded that the monitoring systems 
weren’t actually able to identify patterns of misuse and diversion (Cicero et al 2005). Just before 
and throughout the heavy marketing campaign for OxyContin, the FDA was realizing that its 
safety systems didn’t work to identify drugs being misused - just at the moment the country 
needed those safeguards the most. By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, media reports of 




larger cities particularly in Maine, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia 
(United States General Accounting Office 2003). 
ix: Backlash 
Under public and government pressure to stem off the flow of opioid misuse and 
addiction, Purdue redesigned OxyContin to make the pills more difficult to crush or dissolve, 
theoretically discouraging abuse through inhalation and injection (Cicero et al 2012). The new 
abuse-deterrent pills were released in 2010. If someone managed to crush one of these pills, it 
would form a thick gel that couldn’t be snorted or injected, but this didn’t guarantee that people 
wouldn’t abuse the pills simply by taking lots orally at once (Castillo 2013). This redesign might 
have seemed like an altruistic attempt by purdue to curb a problem that it was responsible for, 
but it could also be seen as a profit-motivated decision. The patent on the original formula that 
made up OxyContin was going to expire in April of 2013, meaning generic extended-release 
oxycodone could be sold, which would threaten the market dominance of OxyContin and 
therefore Purdue’s profits. Generally speaking, the loss of a drug’s patent is associated with a 
reduction in its earning power of approximately eighty to ninety percent (Institute for Health and 
Socio-Economic Policy 2016) Patent expirations between 2009 to 2014 reduced pharmaceutical 
companies’ profits by an estimated $120 billion (Institute for Health and Socio-Economic Policy 
2016).  
Once Purdue obtained a patent on the new abuse-deterrent formula for OxyContin and 
received FDA approval in 2010, the drug’s earning power was protected until 2025 (Bourdet 
2012). The company then stopped producing the original version of the drug. In an ironic twist, 
filed a petition with the FDA asking that it reject future applications for companies hoping to 




inherent in this medication (Bourdet 2012). Purdue had already known that OxyContin was 
highly addictive for nearly a decade, and lied to the government, the public, and providers about 
it. Nonetheless, the FDA agreed to block generic forms of OxyContin from the market, a 
decision that ten generic drug manufacturers have sued over (Bourdet 2012). While these 
lawsuits proceed, OxyContin keeps its market dominance for extended-release oxycodone, and 
Purdue continues to make money off of the crisis it helped create (Sarpatwari et al 2017).  
x. The Rise of Heroin 
There is evidence that the release of the abuse-deterrent OxyContin resulted in a sharp 
decrease in the abuse of OxyContin (Cicero et al 2014). In a 2009-2012 survey of prescription 
opioid addicted patients, those who abused both formulations of OxyContin unanimously 
preferred the original version (Compton et al 2016). But there is also evidence that release of the 
new formula of OxyContin contributed to an increase in heroin abuse (Compton et al 2016).  
One study found that the decrease in the rate of OxyContin abuse was associated with an 
increase in the rate of heroin use in the two years after the introduction of the abuse-deterrent 
formulation, and three and a half years out from its introduction, the rates of OxyContin abuse 
leveled off while rates of heroin use continued to increase (Compton et al 2016).  
Throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, heroin and prescription opioid use and abuse were 
both on the rise (Keyes et al 2014). Beginning in 2006 and 2007, U.S. poison control centers and 
national health surveys began reporting increased instances of heroin use and addiction 
(Compton et al 2016). The rate of hospitalizations for heroin overdoses increased sharply 
between 1993 and 2009, alongside increases in the rate of hospitalizations for prescription opioid 
overdoses (Compton et al 2016). In 2010, eight percent of drug overdose deaths involved heroin, 




Figure 8: Percentage of Heroin vs Natural/Synthetic Opioid U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths, 2010, 
2014, 2015 
Hedegaard et al 2017 
 
 The timing of the increase in heroin use even before the abuse-deterrent formula of 
OxyContin was released in 2010 makes it unlikely that the introduction of the new OxyContin 
pills directly caused an increase in heroin addiction and overdose rates. But it contributed to a 
replacement effect of other opioid medications and heroin as it reduced the ability of recreational 
users to abuse of OxyContin and made the drug less desirable for legal or black market sales and 
purchases (Cicero et al 2012). The black market price for OxyContin pills dropped from seventy 
three cents per milligram for the old pills to fifty two cents for the new abuse-deterrent pills 
(Eban 2011). As heroin is pharmacologically similar to prescription opioids, some users switch 
from using prescription opioid abuse to heroin (Compton et al 2016).  
There are consistent findings of a positive association between heroin abuse and 
prescription opioid abuse (Compton et al 2016). Studies have found that heroin users are more 
likely to report nonmedical use of opioids and opioid addiction than non-heroin users (Compton 
et al 2016). Recreational prescription opioid users are more likely than nonusers to transition to 
using heroin and other illegal drugs (Keyes et al 2014; Compton et al 2016). Studies analyzing 
patterns of opioid abuse suggest that: 
Persons most often start with oral nonmedical use of opioids. They move to more 




to opioids develops and it becomes more costly to maintain their abuse patterns. By the 
time they initiate heroin use, usually through contact with drug users, sexual partners, or 
drug dealers, they view heroin as reliably available, more potent, easier to manipulate for 
non-oral routes, and more cost-effective than prescription opioids (Compton et al 2016). 
 
In a 2014 survey of individuals entering substance abuse treatment, eighty percent of those who 
reported first using opioids in the 1960’s indicated that heroin was their their first opioid. In 
contrast, seventy five percent of those who reported first using in the 2000’s indicated that their 
first opioid was a prescription opioid (Cicero et al 2014). Twenty four percent of opioid users in 
one survey reported finding a way around the tamper-resistant properties of the abuse-deterrent 
formulation, and sixty six percent indicated a switch to another opioid, with “heroin” as the most 
common replacement drug reported (Cicero 2012).  
Most respondents indicated that heroin was the drug they began using because it was now 
easier to use, cheaper, and more widely accessible (Compton et al 2016). Throughout the 2000’s, 
the price of heroin dropped drastically and the drug was becoming more widely distributed 
across to more geographic areas of the country (Compton et al 2016). In comparison with the 
new OxyContin pills, heroin was cheaper and easier to find, as its retail price per gram of heroin 
has been dropping since the early 1980s (Compton et al 2016). One study indicates that a one 
hundred dollar decrease in the price per pure gram of heroin resulted in a nearly three percent 
increase in the number of hospitalizations for heroin overdose (Compton et al 2016).  
xi: Where Do We Go From Here?  
 While some studies that report that only a small percentage of prescription opioid users 
and abusers begin using heroin in the first place (Compton et al 2016; Botticelli 2015), overall 
there is a consensus that the increase in heroin use was “unintended byproduct of efforts to 
crackdown on painkiller abuse that didn’t include treatment of the underlying addiction” (Wilson 




indicated that less than four percent of nonmedical prescription opioid users transitioned to 
heroin use in the first place, but eighty percent of new heroin users reported previous nonmedical 
prescription use (Muhuri, Gfroerer, and Davies 2013). The prevalence of prescription opioids 
and heroin has led to an addiction and overdose crisis the likes of which America has never seen 
before. Between 1999 and 2014, 165,000 Americans died from prescription-opioid overdoses 
(Kano 2016). Overall drug overdoses increased 137% between 2000 and 2014, during which 
overdoses involving specifically prescription opioids and heroin increased 200% (Meldrum 
2016). In 2006, Americans consumed more than twice as many kilograms of opioids as in 1997 
(King et al 2014). The number of patients admitted to substance abuse treatment facilities for 
prescription opioid abuse quadrupled from 23,000 in 1999 to more than 90,000 in 2007 
(Birnbaum et al 2011). In 2008 drug overdoses overtook car accidents as the leading cause of 
accidental death in America and have stayed in the top spot since, with opioid overdoses 
accounting for the largest share of fatal overdoses (Quinones 2015). In 2012 alone, 259 million 
prescriptions were written for opioids, more than enough to give every American adult a bottle of 
pills (Harris et al 2016). In that year, twelve states had more opioid prescriptions written than 
people living in them (Nolan and Amico 2016). In 2014, the CDC began listing opioid overdose 
prevention as one of the top five public health challenges facing the country (Kolodny et al 
2015).  
The crisis has created great economic costs that put rising pressure on federal and state 
finances and economies. One estimate of the total societal costs of prescription opioid abuse 
estimated the costs at $55.7 billion, with lost workplace productivity accounting for $25.6 
billion, healthcare costs $25 billion, and criminal justice costs $5.1 billion (Birnbaum et al 2011). 




health issues accounts for $11.2 billion (Birnbaum et al 2011). Of healthcare costs, substance 
abuse treatment accounted for $1.1 billion, prevention for $85 million, and research for $69 
million (Birnbaum et al 2011). The difference between overall societal costs and spending on 
research and prevention was substantial, with these expenditures only accounting for less than 
one percent of total societal costs (Birnbaum et al 2011). These figures likely understate the true 
economic burden of prescription opioid abuse (Birnbaum et al 2011). The opioid crisis has 
become a puzzle of how to reduce prescription opioid abuse without unintentionally causing 
shifts to heroin abuse instead. State policy responses must fight a battle against the opioid 
epidemic on two fronts: first, to limit the public’s access to powerful prescription opioids while 
maintaining access for people with legitimate pain management needs; and second, to treat those 















Chapter II: Examining Variation in Policy Responses to the Opioid Crisis Across the New 
England States    
This chapter will first define and explain the details of six key policies in general terms 
on the national scale, in order to contextualize the existence of these policies nationwide. I will 
then move into specific comparisons of their implementation in the six New England states.  
i. Continuing Medical Education 
Pain management is considered a medical speciality, meaning primary care physicians 
often receive less formal training in managing pain (Fink-Miller et al 2014). The lack of training 
on pain management is problematic considering primary care doctors are typically the provider 
that patients encounter first when first seeking treatment for their chronic pain (Fink-Miller et al 
2014). In 2010, almost twenty percent of physician office visits where non-cancer pain was 
either a primary symptom or diagnosis resulted in a prescription for opioid painkillers 
(Daubresse et al 2013). Fox et al (2012) argues that primary care doctors who feel poorly 
prepared to treat chronic pain patients may rely too heavily on opioids as a primary treatment 
option, and inadequately monitor patients with opioid prescriptions for signs of addiction and 
diversion. On the contrary, survey evidence from primary care doctors indicates a lack of 
confidence in their training and ability to manage pain and prescribe opioids (Simon 2012, Fink-
Miller 2014, Fox 2012, Davis and Carr 2016). Survey responses also indicate that primary care 
doctors lack of confidence in their pain management training and fear medication misuse and the 
risk of addiction (Simon 2012, Fink-Miller 2014, Fox et al 2012, Davis and Carr 2016).  
Pain management receives insufficient and fragmented attention during medical school 
and residency programs (Simon 2012). A National Institute of Health funded report on the 




and not something that requires direct treatment. The same report found discrepancies in how 
pain is taught in different medical schools, among departments in the same medical school, and 
even within departments in the same medical school (Simon 2012). As most physicians received 
little or no training during medical school regarding evidence-based prescribing, substance abuse 
disorders, and pain management, some states are turning to requiring these topics to be covered 
in certain numbers of hours continuing medical education (CME) courses, which are courses that 
doctors must take throughout their careers to meet certain licensing requirements (Davis and 
Carr 2016), in an attempt to reduce diversion of prescription opioids. 
 While many of these requirements are fairly new, theoretically, requiring physicians to 
obtain CME credits on opioid prescribing and pain management may help reduce over 
prescribing of opioids and eventually decrease opioid-related death rates (Simon 2012). Some 
states may require all or nearly all physicians to obtain CME on pain management and controlled 
substance prescribing, but others may only require doctors who are licensed to prescribe and/or 
actually do prescribe controlled substances to complete CME on pain management and 
controlled substance prescribing. While including few hours of CME infrequently is not likely to 
be sufficient enough to to fully counterbalance the lack of standardized medical school curricula 
or residency training in pain management and opioid prescribing, studies of the impacts of CME 
training initiatives haven shown positive effects on provider knowledge and patient outcomes 
(Simon 2012).   
ii. Opioid Prescribing Guidelines and Regulations 
Prescribing guidelines exist to help physicians make informed choices about treatment. 
Opioid prescribing guidelines provide recommendations for pain treatment based on what the 




Council 2016). The goal is to provide an updated guideline for assessing pain management to 
determine if opioids have been used and/or will be used in the future properly in a way that is 
medically appropriate, and complies with state and federal laws and regulations (Rhyne et al 
2013). These guidelines are not not necessarily legally binding, and are usually only voluntary 
rules issued by state medical boards that physicians are encouraged to consider when prescribing 
opioids. State regulations require prescribers and dispensers to adhere to specific laws regarding 
how often, how many, and in what circumstances opioid medications can be prescribed and 
dispensed for patients. Meara et al (2016) found that at the national level, prevalence of state 
restrictions governing opioid prescribing and dispensing flourished between 2006 and 2012. 
Collectively, states added 81 controlled-substance laws in this period (Meara et al 2016). By 
2012, all states had at least one type of law regulating the prescribing of opioids (Meara et al 
2016).  
iii. Eliminating Pill Mills 
The term “pill mills” colloquially refers to clinics that prescribe controlled medications 
more frequently than standard medical practice dictates (National Safety Council 2016). A pill 
mill refers to a fully licensed physician with valid prescribing authority from the DEA who is 
writing aggressively large quantities of prescriptions and serving a wide geographic area (Betses 
and Brennan 2013).  Pill mills are easy targets for for “doctor shopping” in which individuals fill 
prescriptions from multiple prescribers. A pill mill can be a standalone pain management clinic, 
or an individual prescriber operating within a larger practice’s office or healthcare facility that 
also legitimately treats varied medical conditions. Pain management clinics, which are defined as 
prescribing controlled substances to a majority (fifty one percent) of patients for the treatment of 




“pill mill” from a legitimate pain management practice include: nonexistent or cursory patient 
exams (Garcia 2013), handling a large daily volume of patients (Garcia 2013), not being owned 
by a licensed health care provider (Garcia 2013), only accepting payment in cash, (Garcia 2013; 
Rigg, March, and Inciari 2010), prescribing identical medication regimes to each patient (Garcia 
2013, National Safety Council 2016), utilizing onsite dispensing (Garcia 2013), using a single 
facility for all patients’ magnetic resonance images (Garcia 2013), not using diagnostic 
approaches to pain management (National Safety Council 2016), and not referring patients to 
appropriate specialists (National Safety Council 2016). Many of these warning signs can also 
correspond to legitimate practices, such as hospitals, hospice programs, medical schools or 
training institutions, and ambulatory surgery facilities (Garcia 2013). It is therefore difficult for 
pharmacists and prescribers to recognize patterns of illegal prescribing or doctor shopping. 
Because patients will have a legal prescription from a fully licensed doctor, there is potentially 
no way for other providers, dispensers, and even law enforcement to ascertain which doctors are 
potentially abusing their prescribing abilities (Betses and Brennan 2013).  
Pill mills do not exist in all states, but since most states have no specific legislation 
prohibiting their existence, those that do are often legally permitted to exist even as the 
prescribing habits of doctors are questionable at best and illegal and dangerous at worst. Many 
states with severe pill mill problems, like Florida, now have specific legislation against pill mills 
or making regulations for legitimate pain management clinics stricter. Legislation with this goal 
in mind may include state oversight of pain management clinics through registration or licensure, 
requiring state inspection of the facilities, and requirements that such practices be owned by a 
licensed physician who meets specific education and training criteria in pain management 




New England region, there is still no specific legislation prohibiting or regulating any 
hypothetical clinics that might open in the future (National Safety Council 2016). The 
implementation of these laws is controversial. There are concerns that to avoid registering as a 
pain management clinic and being subject to regulations,  providers could limit prescribing of 
controlled substances to treat pain to just under fifty one percent of their patients to avoid state 
scrutiny (Garcia 2013). It is also possible that by introducing increased regulation of pain 
treatment using prescription opioids, patients with legitimate medical needs for these 
medications to treat their pain may not be able to access care as doctors become wary of 
breaking the rules, fearful of criminal prosecution (Garcia 2013). 
iv. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
At least two out of three people who died of an opioid-related overdose between 2011 
and 2014  had an opioid prescription during those years (Hopkins and Johnson 2017). However, 
only eight percent of people who died from an opioid overdose had legal access to prescription 
opioids through a prescription during the specific month of their death (Hopkins and Johnson 
2017). To counteract illegitimate access to prescription opioids, many states have begun tracking 
legal access to opioids via prescriptions and devising methods of detecting on illegal diversion of 
legally obtained opioids, such as Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) which are 
databases that track individual prescriptions, including patient names, dates and the amounts 
prescribed by which doctor in order to flag suspicious activity on behalf of patients and doctors. 
These databases are not only used for opioids, but for a variety of controlled substances, 
depending on the state. Forty nine states have PDMPs, and not all have the same requirements 
for provider and dispenser reporting (Hopkins and Johnson 2017). General points of variation 




database in different state agencies, requiring different types of prescribers and dispensers to 
report data, who has access to the database itself and its data, deciding how often data must be 
reported (i.e., monthly, weekly, or in real time), and whether data can be shared with other states 
(Garcia 2013). But all have the same prerogative: collect data on the physician who wrote the 
prescription, the pharmacies that dispense the medication, and the patient’s medication history.  
By using a patient’s searchable prescription history in the system, a provider can improve 
the safety of the patient’s drug regimen and coordinate care to ensure all providers are on the 
same page when it comes to the patient’s treatment (Massachusetts Department of Public Health, 
n.d.). The data also can lead to identification of potential illegal prescription drug misuse, abuse, 
and diversion (Massachusetts Department of Public Health, n.d.). PDMPs serve as a central 
repository for this data, and each state has different rules for which authorities and agencies can 
access the data and how (Grill 2013). Analyzing PDMP data can been crucial in reducing 
instances when patients obtain multiple prescriptions from different providers (doctor shopping) 
or have the same prescription filled multiple times at different pharmacies (Massachusetts 
Department of Public Health 2016). Individuals filling prescriptions from three or more 
prescribers within a three month period are at a risk of a fatal opioid overdose that is seven times 
higher than that of those with just one or two prescribers (Hopkins and Johnson 2017). PDMP 
data can also provide patient prescription history information to pharmacies and healthcare 
providers, shape educational outreach efforts to health care providers and the public, and provide 
law enforcement agencies with information necessary to build cases on illegal drug distribution 
(Massachusetts Department of Public Health 2016).  
When writing a prescription for an opioid (or other substance if required by state law), 




When the patient goes to have their prescription refilled, if state regulations require it or if the 
pharmacist has reason to suspicious of the patient’s prescription or has personal knowledge of 
past problems for this patient with prescriptions, the pharmacist may check the patient’s PDMP 
profile before dispensing the medication. After dispensing the medication, the pharmacist will 
enter in the information into the PDMP, which the prescriber will be able to see at the next check 
for that particular patient. Checks may be mandatory or simply encouraged depending on the 
state (Grill 2013).  
PDMPs provide valuable information on the prescribing habits of providers, but are 
potentially missing out on the whole picture of the presence of opioids in the state. Prescription 
drugs that are obtained illegally through theft or street dealing are potentially significant 
contributors to the totality of the opioid overdose epidemic, but will not be captured by a PDMP 
history. A filled prescription does not necessarily indicate that the recipient took all or even any 
of the medication (Massachusetts Department of Public Health 2016). The use of altogether 
illegal opioids (i.e., heroin) will not be captured in a PDMP. Additionally, not every state 
requires all types of medical professionals who may be prescribing opioids to register with the 
PDMP or requires checks of the PDMP at specific times, meaning that PDMPs may be limited in 
tracking prescriptions and prescribers or pharmacists may not check the PDMP regularly. 
The usefulness of PDMPs to combat the opioid epidemic has been studied extensively. 
Patrick et al (2016) studied whether if simply the implementation of a PDMP reduces opioid 
overdose deaths, or if PDMPs must have certain characteristics to be effective in reducing opioid 
overdose deaths. The study found that the implementation of a PDMP was associated with an 
average reduction of 1.12 in opioid-related overdose deaths per 100,000 population in the year 




types of drugs or updating data more frequently, had greater reductions in opioid overdose deaths 
in comparison to states with “weaker” programs. Bao et al (2016) found that the implementation 
of a prescription drug monitoring program was associated with more than a thirty percent 
reduction in the rate of prescribing of opioids in the first three years after implementation of a 
PDMP. Reifler et al (2012) found an association between PDMPs and decreasing opioid abuse 
trends from 2003 to 2009.  
v. Naloxone Availability 
The overdose reversal medication naloxone, while not a controlled substance and not a 
drug with a risk of abuse, requires a prescription, which can be a barrier to access. Prescribers 
may prescribe naloxone to patients that they suspect or know to be abusing opioids, or in 
conjunction with a prescription for opioid medications, but this practice is still relatively 
uncommon. Legal barriers have previously existed to the widespread access to naloxone, even in 
emergency medical care. Whether naloxone can successfully revive someone in the throes of an 
overdose depends on the timeliness of its administration. Death from overdose typically occurs 
within one to three hours, although earlier in some cases (Kim, Irwin, and Khoshnood 2009) One 
dose of naloxone lasts in the body between thirty minutes and one hour (Lopez 2017). This short 
window of time gives the body the opportunity to metabolize more of the opioid, bringing 
someone out of danger of overdosing again after the window of action of naloxone is up (Lopez 
2017). While all states permit paramedics to administer naloxone, not all emergency services 
have paramedics and those that do may only have a small number. Especially in rural areas, 
EMTs may be the only first responders available, and in these rural areas transport times to 
hospitals are often long. EMTs outnumber paramedics three to one nationwide (Davis et al 




the techniques or administering drugs that paramedics can - including naloxone, up until 
recently. Allowing EMTs to administer naloxone has been demonstrated to reduce time between 
overdose to naloxone, and as overdoses become more common in a service area, can free up 
paramedics to respond to other emergencies that might require more intensive paramedic-level 
treatment (Davis et al 2014).  
Between sixty five and ninety seven percent of those who misuse drugs have reported 
witnessing an overdose (Kim, Irwin, and Khoshnood 2009). But many of these witnesses are 
loathe to call 911, which is often perceived as a last resort, occurring only an estimated ten to 
fifty six percent of the time, because police are typically notified of an overdose report to 911 
and will appear at the scene of the emergency (Kim, Irwin, and Khoshnood 2009). People who 
witness an overdose often likely fear being charged for possession of illegal drugs, illegal use of 
legal drugs, or other crimes (Davis et al 2017). Bystanders can be arrested for drug possession 
and even charged with murder if police suspect that they were responsible for supplying the 
drugs to the victim of a fatal overdose (Hawk, Vaca, and D’Onofrio 2015). Because opioid 
overdose often occurs when the victim is with associates, friends, and family, these are the 
individuals who are often in the best position to administer naloxone. Logistically speaking, 
naloxone can be administered by a person with no advanced medical training. But many 
bystanders will not have it accessible. State practice laws generally prohibit the prescription of 
medications to third parties, or people other than the individuals who will be taking the drug, and 
also typically prohibit prescriptions being given as standing orders, meaning to individuals who 
are not patients of the prescribers. Prescribers are often concerned about exposing themselves to 
potential liability when prescribing naloxone both to individuals at risk of overdose, and to non-




Improving access to naloxone requires making exceptions to prescribing regulations to 
allow more citizens to get naloxone prescribed and dispensed to them, and allow their use of the 
drug without fear of legal retribution. The National Bureau of Economic Research found that the 
adoption of a naloxone access law is associated with a nine to eleven percent decrease in the 
opioid-related deaths in a state, and that Good Samaritan laws for overdose victims who get 
treated and for witnesses calling for help were associated with a similar though not statistically 
significant reduction. While there are some who argue against making naloxone more accessible 
on the grounds that it could encourage more frequent or higher-volume drug use if users perceive 
it as a safety net. But surveys of opioid users have demonstrated that the majority of respondents 
do not see naloxone this way (Kim, Irwin, and Khoshnood 2009).  These laws have not been 
found to be associated with an increase in non-medical use of prescription painkillers (Davis et al 
2017).  While naloxone saves lives, it is not in a pleasant way. The administration of naloxone 
reverses an overdose, but in doing so, forces the body into the withdrawal symptoms that those 
who are addicted to opioids continue taking drugs to prevent, but the withdrawal symptoms are 












Table 3: Summary of Naloxone Availability Policies 
Policy Type What Does it Mean? 
Permit prescriptions to third parties   Someone who isn’t personally at risk of 
overdosing can receive a prescription for 
Naloxone from a doctor and get it filled. 
Permit dispensing by standing order   
  
 
A physician can write an order that says 
naloxone can be distributed by other health 
care workers who fulfill specified conditions. 
For example, if a pharmacist is to distribute 
the naloxone, someone could receive 
naloxone without ever seeing the doctor who 
officially prescribed it. 
Provide criminal, civil and professional 
immunity to prescribers, dispensers, and 
administrators 
Those who prescribe, dispense, or administer 
naloxone cannot be prosecuted, sued, or 
professionally disciplined for doing so. 
Permit lay dispensing and administration   Allows laypeople to possess naloxone and 
administer with and/or without a prescription, 
depending on the state. 
Good Samaritans protections for people 
reporting overdoses  
Provides limited criminal immunity to a 
witness calling for help in event of overdose 
emergency, and to the overdose victim 
Expanding what types of first responders can 
administer naloxone 
EMTs, law enforcement, and firefighters can 
administer naloxone. 
Davis 2015 
vi. Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) 
The use of medications, in addition to counseling and participation in social support 
programs, to treat opioid addiction is referred to as “medication-assisted treatment” or MAT 
(SAMHSA 2015).  MAT is officially defined by SAMHSA as “the use of medications, in 
combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to provide a whole-patient approach to 
the treatment of substance use disorders.” (Letendre et al 2016; 8). Three medications have been 
approved by the FDA for MAT: methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone (Letendre et al 




opioid, and relieve withdrawal symptoms (Joseph, Stancliff, and Langrod 2000). Buprenorphine 
and methadone are opioids, and naltrexone is a non-opioid. In comparison to the rapid onset and 
short duration of action of other opioids on the brain, buprenorphine and methadone have a 
slower, more gradual process of affecting the opioid receptors in the brain (National Institute on 
Drug Abuse 2018).  This prevents the appearance of physically uncomfortable withdrawal 
symptoms and reduces cravings (Jones 2004).  
Since 1986, U.S. spending on inpatient substance abuse treatment has decreased 
dramatically, while spending on outpatient and residential treatment has increased (Urahn et al 
2015). One aspect of the shift from inpatient to outpatient treatment has been the increased use of 
medication-assisted treatment (MAT) using buprenorphine and methadone, driven by the 
increase in opioid addiction and in the development of buprenorphine (Urahn et al 2015). 
Between 1986 and 2003, a negligible portion of treatment spending was directed toward 
prescription drugs for MAT. From 2002 to 2012, the percentage of treatment admissions in 
which opiates were the primary substance of abuse increased from eighteen to twenty six percent 
(Urahn et al 2015). As of 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, MAT 
accounted for four percent of all substance use disorder treatment spending (Urahn et al 2015).  
MAT has gained popularity in recent years as it has been found to decrease death rates 
from opioid use, increase time spent in treatment; reduce addiction treatment costs, reduce 
overdose rates, increase abstinence from using opioids, and the risk of contracting HIV or 
hepatitis C for patients receiving MAT (Letendre et al 2016). MAT programs designed to offer 
long-term “maintenance” treatment have been found to be more effective than short-term 
“detox” programs that seek to manage withdrawal and stop all opioid use cold-turkey within a 




associated with better treatment program retention rates and lower rates of opioid abuse 
compared to patients in “detox” withdrawal management programs where the goal is simply 
cutting out opioid use (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Detox program 
participation is associated with a high relapse rate, and detox has been generally found to be an 
inadequate treatment for opioid dependence when viewing it as a chronic, recurrent condition 
(Nyosk et al 2013). MAT without a hard and fast limit on the permissible length of time spent on 
medication has the greatest likelihood of patients staying in treatment and reducing their risk of 
dying by overdose (Williams and Bisaga 2016).  Also contributing to the popularity of MAT is 
that economic modeling of MAT options has revealed that the added health care costs of 
treatment are offset by reductions in other health care costs for individuals with opioid addictions 
(Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014).  
 Ironically, there is evidence that a high percentage of opioid-related deaths have been 
caused by methadone, which has traditionally been used for substance abuse treatment (King et 
al 2014). There is substantial evidence that methadone prescriptions for pain management 
purposes may have contributed to increased opioid-related mortality (King et al 2014). One U.S. 
study indicated that methadone was responsible for twice as many single-drug deaths as any 
other opioid (King et al 2014), and another 2002 study indicated that the varying presence of 
methadone and oxycodone alone accounted for a large proportion of geographic variation in 
opioid-related mortality (King et al 2014). Methadone can be prescribed in tablet form for pain 
by a provider with a DEA registration, as it has pain killing effects on a similar order of 
magnitude as morphine (Anderson and Kearney 2006). Methadone prescriptions increased 
during the late 1990’s and 2000’s, potentially due to it its attractive pricing (King et al 2014). As 




patients receive methadone instead of a more expensive patent-protected medication like 
OxyContin (King et al 2014). But to treat addiction, it can only dispensed in a liquid format by a 
licensed accredited opioid treatment program (OTP), often referred to as a methadone clinic 
(Letendre et al 2016).  
Methadone is a full agonist. It works by fully binding to the opioids receptors until the 
receptors are all active. This full activation does not provide a high, but eliminates withdrawal 
symptoms on long-term basis and blocking the effects of other opioids taken (Nyosk et al 2013). 
But due to this full binding activity, methadone can be addictive and carry a risk of overdose. At 
an OTP, the patient must take the dose of methadone under direct observation by a provider 
(Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014) because methadone has the greatest potential 
for abuse and overdose of all the drugs used for MAT. For the same reason, dosing is 
individually tailored to the patient’s level of physical dependence on opioids (Institute for 
Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Dosing is fraught, as there is a small difference between a 
therapeutic and a toxic dose (King et al 2014), requiring close supervision of the patient. While 
there is concern that methadone used for treatment can be diverted for illegal use by those 
without prescriptions for the medication, opioid diversion monitoring systems show that the 
methadone tablets formulated for pain medication purposes only are more likely to be diverted 
than the oral format of methadone used in MAT or buprenorphine (Noysk et al 2013).   
Buprenorphine is a partial agonist, meaning it also binds to opioid receptors, but its 
stimulating effects are limited. It is less potent than methadone, but its effects can last longer 
(Mattick et al 2014). This limited impact means that buprenorphine might be best targeted to 
patients with lower levels of physical dependence on opioids (Institute for Clinical and 




including methadone. So if an individual with buprenorphine in their system takes another 
opioid, the buprenorphine will block it from reaching the receptors. If an individual who already 
has an opioid in their system takes buprenorphine, the buprenorphine will replace the other 
opioid in the receptors (Jones 2004).  
Buprenorphine has a ceiling effect, meaning that its effects plateau at a saturation point at 
which neither its effects nor the effects of a different opiate will increase, even if the user takes 
more opioids (Addiction Treatment Forum 2013). With this ceiling effect, there is no additional 
benefit gained by increasing the dose beyond a certain point, depending on the patient’s level of 
previous opioid use (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). This ceiling effect makes 
it less effective than methadone for patients with severe opioid dependency issues, but it also 
prevents the adverse effects of methadone (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014).  
The lesser potency of buprenorphine means it has a lesser chance of abuse than 
methadone (Mattick et al 2014). Taking more buprenorphine won’t increase the user’s sensations 
of the drug in their system, but can potentially still cause an overdose if individuals try taking 
more. The combination of buprenorphine and naloxone, the overdose reversal drug, in Suboxone 
is safer than a drug containing pure buprenorphine and is therefore most commonly used for 
buprenorphine based MAT (The National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment). 
Pure buprenorphine alone can be used, but is most often prescribed to pregnant women receiving 
MAT, as naloxone should not be used during pregnancy (Institute for Clinical and Economic 
Review 2014). Buprenorphine and naloxone combined has a longer half-life (the time it takes for 
the concentration of the substance in the body to fall by half) than almost all other opioids, 
meaning that the effects last longer than that of other opioids, allowing for a longer dosing 




they must report in person to a MAT location to take methadone under supervision. Methadone 
is administered between one to four times a day, but buprenorphine can be taken once twice a 
day (Lopez 2017).  
Clinical studies of these medications generally find no statistically-significant differences 
in illicit drug use, criminal activity, or mortality between methadone and buprenorphine 
treatment (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Buprenorphine has a lower risk of 
overdose and recreational use and abuse, and is easier to access and administer (Garcia-Portilla 
et al 2014). Methadone treatment is associated with higher rates of treatment retention relative to 
buprenorphine treatment (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Both opioids have 
both been found to be highly effective in for withdrawal management in the short term and 
addiction treatment in the long run (Letendre et al 2016).  
Because buprenorphine has a lesser chance of being abused and a lesser a risk of 
overdose (when combined with naloxone) it is available in an-office based setting from a retail 
pharmacy with a qualified doctor’s prescription, meaning users can take it in their own home on 
their own time (IMS Institute for Healthcare Infomatics 2016). Methadone has a higher chance 
of abuse and overdose, and so the drug must be dispensed in a clinical rather than office-based 
setting (IMS Institute for Healthcare Infomatics 2016) in an OTP. OTPs are treatment facilities 
certified by SAMHSA and regulated by a diverse group of agencies including the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and various state 
agencies (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014).  
MAT with buprenorphine offers fewer legal, regulatory, and abuse and diversion issues 
than MAT with methadone does (Ducharme and Abraham 2008). Rather than an OTP, 




buprenorphine, doctors must go through eight hours of training sponsored by certified groups 
like American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, American Psychiatric Association, and the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine; and guarantee they have the ability to refer patients for 
counseling and other services to receive a buprenorphine waiver from the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (Letendre et al 2016). The waiver allows the doctor to prescribe buprenorphine 
for no more than thirty patients at any given time during the first year (Polydorou, Gunderson, 
and Levin 2008).  
The doctor can apply to increase to one hundred patients after this first year (Letendre et 
al 2016). Patients on buprenorphine prescriptions must meet specific criteria for opioid 
dependence, and follow up with regular office visits in which care is documented extensively 
and the physician refers the patient for additional counseling and other social services (Letendre 
et al 2016). Since 2002, more than 12,000 physicians have received a waiver, and more than half 
are not addiction specialists (Polydorou, Gunderson, and Levin 2008). But simply having a 
waiver does not mean that doctors will prescribe buprenorphine. Surveys of waivered doctors 
revealed reports of prescriber’s lack of experience in pain management, difficulty starting to 
prescribe buprenorphine, low reimbursement for prescribing buprenorphine, and low levels of 
patient compliance, contributing to a reluctance to prescribe buprenorphine (Polydorou, 
Gunderson, and Levin 2008). One study noted that more than forty percent of physicians with 
waivers had not treated any patients with buprenorphine. Of those physicians who had prescribed 
buprenorphine, 25% reported that these challenges caused them to reduce the number of patients 
they treat or to stop providing buprenorphine treatment (Polydorou, Gunderson, and Levin 




remote areas, which may lack an OTP or patients may lack the means of transportation to travel a 
long distance to an OTP (Ducharme and Abraham 2008).  
Naltrexone is a non-opioid treatment option that has been available since 1994, and 
primarily used for the treatment of alcohol addiction (Ducharme and Abraham 2008). It is a 
complete opioid antagonist, meaning it blocks the opioid receptors in the brain from receiving an 
opioid and producing a high (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Because it is not 
an opioid, it has no risk of addiction or diversion, but it does not control craving for opioids or 
withdrawal symptoms. To begin taking Naltrexone, individuals must be completely free from 
any and all opioids for at least seven days which is often a hurdle to beginning the medication 
(Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2014). Retention rates for naltrexone treatments are 
typically low, and the drug has a high rate of relapse (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 
2014). It can be prescribed in an office-based setting by any healthcare provider licensed to 
prescribe medications, such as nurse practitioners and physicians assistants in addition to 
physicians. There is no limit on the number of patients a provider may prescribe this medication 












Table 4: Comparisons of Methadone, Buprenorphine, and Naltrexone 
 Methadone Buprenorphine Naltrexone 
Mechanism of action Full agonist: 
Binds to and activates 
receptors 
Prevents withdrawal 
and craving for 
opioids 
Partial agonist: 





Binds to opioid 
receptors to block the 
effects of opioids on 
the receptors. 
Used for  Withdrawal 
management and 




treatment for opioid 
addiction 
Treatment for opioid 
addiction 
Administered Multiple times/day Once a day Monthly 
Available from A certified OTP Any licensed 
physician with a DEA 
registration and a 
buprenorphine waiver  
Any healthcare 
provider who has a 
license  
Relative Cost Low Medium High 
Overdose Risk High Moderate None 
Diversion Risk High High Low 
Letendre et al 2016 
 All states have their own regulations regarding addiction treatment, such as licensure and 
certification, financing (including disbursement of block grant funds, and setting Medicaid 
formularies and coverage limitations), and acceptable use of medications (Ducharme and 
Abraham 2008). Due to or despite state regulations, MAT locations can still be few and far 
between, inaccessible due to a lack of treatment capacity, and otherwise poorly integrated into 
the state’s healthcare landscape and disassociated from other services available (Ducharme and 
Abraham 2008). The vast majority of states have demand for buprenorphine and methadone 
MAT that far exceeds the available stock of treatment providers and facilities. National rates of 




buprenorphine treatment capacity (420.3) and number of people receiving methadone at an OTP  
(119.9) (National Safety Council 2016). 
vii. State Comparisons Across Policies 
a. State Comparison: Continuing Medical Education 
Table 5: State Comparison of Continuing Medical Education Requirements 
State Applies to  Prescribing Education Pain Management 
Education 
CT All physicians 1 hour in pain 
management and 
controlled substance 
prescribing every 6 
years. 
1 hour in pain 
management and 
controlled substance 
prescribing every 6 
years. 
ME Physicians who 
prescribe controlled 
substances 
3 hours on opioid 
prescribing every 2 
years. 
None 
MA Physicians who 
prescribe controlled 
substances 
3 credits in opioid 
education and pain 
management. 
3 credits in opioid 
education and pain 
management. 
NH Physicians who 
prescribe controlled 
substances  
None 3 hours on pain 
management and 
addiction 
RI All physicians None None - of the 40 
hours required every 
2 years, 2 hours is 




doctors could choose 
to not complete this 
category. 
VT Physicians who 
prescribe controlled 
substances 
Of the 30 hours 
required every 2 
years, 2 hours must 
be on safe and 
effective prescribing 
-Of the 30 hours 
required every 2 
years; 1 hour must be 
on hospice or 





substances and pain 
management. 
management.  
-2 hours on safe and 
effective prescribing 
of controlled 
substances and pain 
management. 
Federation of State Medical Boards 2018; Davis and Carr 2016; New Hampshire Office of Professional Licensure 
and Certification Board of Medicine, n.d. 
 
b. State Comparison: Regulatory and Prescribing Guidelines 
Table 6: Regulatory and Prescribing Guidelines by State 
State Regulatory 
Guideline? 
Date Implemented Prescribing 




CT  Yes 2015, 2016 No 
ME Yes 2012, 2016 No 
MA Yes 2016 Yes 
NH Yes 2016 Yes  
RI Yes 2014, 2016 No 
VT Yes 2014 Yes 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Training and Technical Assistance Center 2017 
 
c. State Comparison: Eliminating Pill Mills 











d. State Comparison: Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
Table 7: PDMP Basics 












CT  2006 2008 Yes Yes 
ME 2003 2004 Yes Yes 
MA 1992 1994 No Yes 
NH 2012 2014 Yes Yes 
RI 1978 1979 Yes Yes 
VT 2006 2009 Yes Yes 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Training and Technical Assistance Center 2017; Davis n.d.; Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Training and Assistance Center n.d. 
 
Table 8: Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Check Requirements 
State Required Check by 
Prescriber? 




CT -Before prescribing a 
supply for more than 
72 hours. If supply is 
less than 72 hours, no 
check required. 
-When prescribing 
opioids to patients for 
long term treatment, 
the provider must 
review the patient’s 
records in PDMP at 
least every 90 days.  
No  Real Time/Within 24 
hours  
ME -Before prescribing  
-Every 90 days for as 
long as that 
prescription is 
Only if: 
-Patient or prescriber 
is from out of state 
-Patient is paying 





renewed cash when the person 
has prescription 
insurance on file, or -
Patient has not had a 
prescription for an 
opioid in the previous 
12 months. 
MA Before prescribing  No Within 24 hours/one 
business day  
NH -Before prescribing, -
At least twice per 
year after initial 
prescribing 
No Within 24 hours/one 
business day 
RI -Before prescribing 
-Every three months 
for patients on 
continuous opioid 
therapy for three 
months or longer 
-Every 12 months if 
the patient is on the 
opioid for a period of 
six months or longer 
No Real Time 
VT -Before prescribing, 
but if prescription is 
for ten or fewer pills, 
no check is required 
-Annually for patients 
who are receiving 
ongoing treatment 
with an opioid  
-Twice annually for 




written at an OTP) -
every 120 days for 
any patient prescribed 
40 mg or greater of 
extended-release 
hydrocodone or 30 
Only if: 
-A patient who is new 
to the pharmacy has a 
prescription for ten 
pills or the equivalent 
-When patient pays 
cash for a prescription 
of opioids but has 
prescription drug 
coverage on file; -
When a patient 
requests a refill of a 
prescription 
substantially in 
advance of when a 
refill should be 
necessary  
-Dispenser is aware 
that the patient is 





mg or greater of 
extended-release 
oxycodone per day 
that is not an abuse-
deterrent opioid. 
being prescribed 
opioids by more than 
one prescriber 
National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws 2016; The Pew Charitable Trusts 2018; Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center 2018; Federation of State Medical Boards 2018; 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center n.d.; Maine State Legislature 
2017; Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection n.d 
 






CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Prescriber x x x x x x 
Prescriber 
Delegate 
x x x x x x 
Physician 
Assistant 
x x x x x  
Nurse 
Practitioner 
x x x x x  
Pharmacist x x x x x x 
Pharmacist 
Delegate 
x x x x x  
Pharmacy  x x x   
Law 
Enforcement 
x x x x x x 
Licensing 
Boards 
 x x x x x 
Patient  x x x x x 
State Health 
Agency 
    x x 







 x  x x x 
Drug Court    x   









 x     
Healthcare 
Facility 
 x     
Researcher  x x  x  
Prescription Drug Monitoring Training and Assistance Center n.d. 
 
e. State Comparison: Naloxone Access 
Table 10: Who Can Access Naloxone and Where? 
Policy CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Permit prescriptions to 
third parties   
x x x x x x 
Permit prescription and 
dispensing by standing 
order   
  
 
 x x x x x 
Provide civil, criminal, 
and professional 
immunity to prescribers 
x x  x x 
(professio
nal only) 
x (civil and 
criminal 
only) 
Provide civil, criminal, 
and professional 
x x  x x 
(professio





immunity to dispensers nal only) only) 
Permit lay dispensing 
and administration 
 x  x x x 
Provide civil and 
criminal immunity to 
lay administrators 
x x x x x x 
Permit lay possession 
without prescription 
  x  x x 
Good Samaritan 
protections for people 
reporting overdoses  




  x  x x 
Davis et al 2018 
f. State Comparison: Treatment Access 
Table 11: Access to MAT (2017) by State 








prescribers with 100 
patients 
CT  41 284 33 
ME 11 198 27 
MA 76 575 81 
NH 8 142 27 
RI 20 95 16 
VT 11 75 10 
SAMHSA, n.d. 
 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island do not have adequate treatment 




Vermont had maximum buprenorphine treatment capacity sufficient to meet the treatment need 
in their state (National Safety Council 2016). Vermont has become a national leader in substance 
abuse treatment policy by implementing an innovative centrally managed network of OTP 
locations that are integrated into the state’s previously existing healthcare network. Vermont was 
an early adopter of office-based use of methadone and buprenorphine (Meyer and Phillips 2015) 
which was strengthened through the 2014 implementation of the Care Alliance for Opioid 
Addiction, also known as the “Hub and Spoke” model. The Hub and Spoke model was created 
by Vermont doctor John Brooklyn, MD and and is run by the State of Vermont through the 
Blueprint for Health initiative, the Department of Vermont Health Access, and the Vermont 
Department of Health’s Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs (Vermont Agency of 
Human Services, n.d.). Brooklyn described the model as having “benefited from its status as a 
fully funded program through Medicaid expansion and political and governmental support that is 
also unique in the United States” (Brooklyn and Sigmon 2017).  
A “Hub” is a regional opioid treatment center designed to coordinate care and support 
services for patients with an opiate addiction in addition to co-occurring substance abuse and/or 
some mental health conditions. A “Spoke” is a primary care practice or health center, which 
coordinates the care and support services for patients without these other health concerns. There 
are nine Hub locations across the state. Each serves as the site of its geographic area’s most 
intensive opioid use disorder treatment options. The spokes are mostly primary care or family 
medicine practices, and but also include obstetrics and gynecology practices, specialty outpatient 
addiction programs, and practices specializing in chronic pain ( Vermont Agency of Human 
Services, n.d.). The Spokes are served by physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants 




include one nurse and one licensed mental health or addictions counselor per 100 patients. Their 
job is to provide specialized nursing, counseling and care management to support patients in 
recovery. The team element helps providers balance MAT patient care with the needs of their 
full patient population (Vermont Agency of Human Services, n.d.). This system “links OTPs and 
office-based opioid treatment programs together under one system of care and triages patients to 
appropriate levels of treatment based on each individual’s needs.” (Institute for Clinical and 
Economic Review 2014; 29). The treatment available at both Hubs and Spokes is not restricted 
to MAT, as patients also have access to psychosocial services from social workers, counselors, 
and community health teams embedded within spoke sites (Chou et al 2016). Patients can access 
alternative pain management methods, family support, life skills training and job trainings 
here(Simpatico 2015).  
In 2016, roughly six thousand people were participating in the state's Hub and Spoke 
treatment model (Costa 2016) The strength of the Hub and Spoke model is its flexibility, as 
patients can shift between the two types of centers as their addiction symptoms improve or 
worsen  and their needs change (Meyer and Phillips 2015). Patients with severe initial needs will 
begin treatment at a Hub, but may eventually transition a Spoke, while patients with less 
complex needs may begin their treatment at a Spoke (Vermont Agency of Human Services, n.d.) 
The system is also strengthened by its geographic range, as Hubs and Spokes combined spread 
treatment access out over greater distances than a clinic that combines both functions into one 
building, thus increasing patient access in a rural area (Mohlman et al 2016). Vermont now has 
the highest capacity for treating opioid addiction in the United States, with 10.56 people in 




since the opioid crisis began, there were no waiting lists for treatment in all 14 counties of 
Vermont (Ready-Campbell 2017).  
 Maine has also implemented a Hub and Spoke model that copied Vermont’s system, and 
was also recognized for being one of three states with adequate treatment capacity to meet 
demand by the NSC. However, Maine’s access to treatment comes with the caveat that use of 
buprenorphine requires evidence of monthly monitoring in the form of pill counts or urine tests, 




















Chapter III: Analyzing The Relationship between Governor Prioritization of and Budget 
Allocation for the Opioid Crisis 
i: Literature Review 
I argue that governors are in the best political position to shift societal and legislative 
attitudes towards opioids. Governors are the most visible officeholder in state governments 
(Barilleaux and Berkman 2003). Not only are they the most visible, but governors have the top 
role in setting the statewide policy agenda. They are the officeholder best in position to provide 
an authoritative assessment of a state’s well-being and needs, and to propose solutions through a 
policy agenda (Gosling 1991). In contrast, the state legislature, with it’s “fragmentation and 
reliance on contained specialization” (Gosling 1991; 3) is not as well positioned to offer a clear 
policy vision for the state as a governor is. Governors set the policy agenda for their state 
(Gosling 1991). After spending a campaign offering policy goals and suggestions, governors 
arrive into office as the central figure for requests and demands for action or inaction (Gosling 
1991).  
 The governor also looms largest in the public and legislative consciousness regarding the 
budget process. The governor plays a large formal role in the creation of and negotiations 
regarding the state budget. In almost every state, it is the executive branch responsible for putting 
together a proposed budget (Wallins 1998). A 1975 survey of state senators indicated that over 
fifty percent of the respondents who gave meaningful responses believed budget formation to be 
the most important formal gubernatorial tool (Bernick 1979). Most state fiscal years run from 
July 1 to June 30, and governors typically begin the process of creating a proposed budget by 
soliciting budget requests from state agencies in July or August, which are received and 




projected appropriations and revenues to the legislature typically in late January or early 
February (Wallins 1998). The budget is usually referred to one appropriations committee in each 
chamber, which works on the budget bill before sending it to the floor of the whole chamber to 
be further amended and voted on (Wallins 1998). Most of the time, each state chamber passes a 
slightly different budget, and a conference committee appointed by the leaders of the legislature 
will work out a compromise budget which must be approved by both houses (Wallins 1998). 
This is the final budget bill that is sent to the governor to be signed (or vetoed, which almost 
never happens) (Wallins 1998). Budget bills thus follow the same legislative process that all 
other types of bills must follow in order to become law. But budget bills are also unique pieces 
of legislation as unlike other bills, if a budget bill does not become law, essential government 
services are terminated (Crain and Miller 1990). High political, economic, and social costs are 
associated with failure to enact the bill as the government will enter into a shutdown and cease 
normal operations (Crain and Miller 1990). Budget bills are also unique as they happen over and 
over again on a regular, predictable schedule (Crain and Miller 1990). The importance and 
regularity of the budget means that a unique “budget process” has developed to move budget 
bills through the legislative and executive branches, with its own specialized procedures and 
institutions separate from those of the typical “legislative process” (Crain and Miller 1990; 
1025). 
 The budget process requires the governor to act as a budget balancer (Wallin 1998) due 
to public and logistical pressures. State revenue sources have become less elastic over time 
(Thompson 1987). Anton (1967) argues that instead of focusing on deciding to reduce, continue, 
or expand state activities, governors instead must focus on increasing revenues to keep pace with 




the change in inputs and expenditures from the previous year’s budget (Wallin 1998). Because of 
limits on revenue increases out of fear that residents will leave the state to avoid paying higher 
taxes and expenditure pressures due to inflation and increasing population size, the budget 
process is highly revenue-constrained and routinized, with the appropriations decisions made by 
political actors made under heavy external pressure (Wallin 1998).  
One such external pressure is the need for a balanced budget. Anton (1967) also argues 
that a governor must try to maintain a balanced budget even if one is not legally required, 
because of public concern for "fiscal integrity." This demand for a balanced budget coupled with 
the complexity of funding sources, and the pre-existing investment in state activities that must be 
continued, creates an expenditure base that resists policy innovation and has built-in pressures 
for increasing expenditure (Anton 1967). Governors typically will submit a balanced proposed 
budget (Wallin 1998). Submitting a balanced budget to the legislature means that the governor 
gains power over the legislature as to the ultimate structure of the budget (Wallin 1998). For 
example, if a legislature wants tax cuts but the governor’s proposed budget is already balanced, 
the onus is on the legislature to find places to reduce appropriation levels. Similarly, if the 
legislature wants to increase spending in comparison to what the governor’s proposed balanced 
budget does, the legislature must be willing and able to find revenues to finance it (Wallin 1998). 
But just because a governor theoretically has such an advantage over the legislature does not 
mean that a governor gets their proposed budget implemented. 
 Not all states afford the same level of formal powers to the governor, and not all 
governors take advantage of their state’s full range of powers (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988). 
The formal powers of a governor entrusted to the executive branch via statutory or constitutional 




formal powers give a governor the opportunity to wield influence, but do not guarantee that the 
governor will be able to achieve their desired outcome through using their formal powers. 
Similarly, just because the office of the governor in a particular state has the legal authority to do 
something does not mean that every individual governor to hold the office will use said power to 
the fullest extent permissible (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988). Some governors are more likely to 
utilize these powers than others (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988). The power a governor wields in 
practice depends heavily on their personal relationships to the other branches of government and 
the public. Not all governors will be influential, even if they possess great formal powers 
(Sigelman and Dometrius 1988). Measuring a governor’s influence, which is to say the 
governor’s actual power, is difficult, but it is through the governor’s influence that bills 
successfully pass or not (Ransone 1979).  
A formal power of consequence for my research question is the existence of the line-item 
veto, a special form of the executive veto available to governors in forty four states. With the 
line-item veto, a governor can remove certain items from the budget without having to accept 
them as part of approving the entire appropriation package (Lauth 2016). The line-item veto can 
be used to eliminate appropriation items (dollars), or to delete language that imposes conditions 
or limitations on an appropriation item without eliminating the item itself (Lauth 2016). The line 
item veto allows a governor to stave off additions or changes to the budget proposal from the 
legislature that the governor rules inconsistent with their own policy priorities (Lauth 2016).  
Dearden and Husted (1993) theorized that the existence of line item vetoes allows 
governors to have better ability to pass budgets that they prefer. Their study found that final state 
expenditure budgets is closer to the governor's proposed expenditure budgets when line-item 




theory line-item veto strengthens the governor's ability to obtain a more desirable budget. This 
study is of particular consequence for studying the New England region, as it contains three of 
the six state governments that do not permit the governor the power of the line-item veto: New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Lauth 2016).  
 According to Barilleaux and Berkman (2003), most research studying American state 
policy making focuses on the legislative branch at the expense of the executive branch. Such 
research is often views these offices in black and white with little room for gray, portraying 
governors as either highly influential or completely inconsequential (Barilleaux and Berkman 
2003). There are two dominant traditions for studying influence in state budgets (Dometrius et al 
2013). The first uses actual budget documents to investigate the power of the executive, an 
approach that began with Sharkansky (1968) (Dometrius et al 2013). The second scholarly 
tradition involves using survey data from observer participations of actor influence survey data 
(Dometrius et al 2013).  
Studying the governor’s role in the budget process began in earnest in the 1960s, 
beginning with Sharkansky (1968). Sharkansky’s groundbreaking work explored the behaviors 
of state agencies, governors, and the legislature during the budget process and the environmental 
conditions that enhance or limit said behaviors (Thompson 1987). Sharkansky (1968) concluded 
that based on an examination of final budget documents from 1965-1967, legislatures typically 
deferred to the governor for budget matters (Abney and Lauth 1988) and that successful 
individual agency acquisition of appropriations is highly dependent on governor support 
(Thompson 1987). Sharkansky (1968) concluded that due to limitations on time, staff, and 
expertise, state budgeting is an incremental process in which the legislature must follow the 




framework for researching the role of the governor and legislature, coming at a key moment in 
which the role of the governor and the legislatures in the began to shift, changing the degree the 
role and powers of a governor in the budget process.   
 The role of the governor and the legislature experienced significant change between the 
mid-1960’s and mid-1980’s (Thompson 1987). Beginning with Maryland in 1916 and continuing 
through the 1960’s, states began implementing executive budget reform laws that gave state 
governors stronger control of state finances (Abney and Lauth 1998). Most states went through 
periods of administrative reform that streamlined the organization and introduced greater 
professionalization to the executive branch (Thompson 1987). Governors were granted the power 
to create and formally propose an executive budget, which gave governors greater access to 
information about state finances and the opportunity and capacity to define the legislative agenda 
(Abney and Lauth 1998). As such, governors gained greater enabling and institutional resources, 
which gave the executive branch a serious advantage over legislatures in the appropriations 
process, leading to executive dominance in the budget process (Abney and Lauth 1998). 
Governors became the dynamic factor in state political systems while legislatures were viewed 
as inefficient and parochial (Moe 1988). The governorship was further enhanced throughout the 
mid 1960s to 1980’s by increasing appointment powers, giving the governor greater power over 
reorganization, improving executive staffing, and centralizing management responsibilities 
(Thompson 1987). As a result, governors moved to positions occupying more power and more 
prestige in the collective consciousness of Americans (Thompson 1987). 
During the 19th century, the legislature dominated the appropriations process (Abney and 
Lauth 1998). But after World War I, the nation’s population began to shift from rural to urban 




with the population shift. The role of state legislatures was limited due to this malapportionment, 
as well as archaic legislative rules, traditions, and practices as well as constitutional limitations 
and low levels of appropriations for their activities (Thompson 1987). As a result, legislatures 
were not well organized and were poorly equipped to exert influence over budgets (Thompson 
1987).  
A renewed interest in the role of state legislatures arose in the 1960’s out of a series of 
Supreme Court decisions (Thompson 1987). In Baker v. Carr (1962), the Supreme Court ruled 
for the first time that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to state 
legislative redistricting plans (National Conference of State Legislatures 2018). In Wesberry v. 
Sanders (1964), the Court held that the constitutionality of congressional districts could be 
decided by courts (National Conference of State Legislatures 2018). In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 
the Supreme Court ruled that both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned 
according to population, and may not reflect population equality unless doing so is necessary to 
give representation to political subdivisions and account for compact districts of contiguous 
territory (National Conference of State Legislatures 2018). The ruling in Reynolds vs. Sims 
(1964) also held that legislative districts should be drawn to reflect population shifts at least once 
every ten years (National Conference of State Legislatures 2018). These cases created a renewed 
awareness of the importance of state legislatures and catalyzed the creation of reforms designed 
to revitalize the institution (Thompson 1987).  
During the 1970’s, the power of the legislatures also began improving as legislatures  
professionalized, as legislatures began meeting more often and paying their legislators more 
(Abney and Lauth 1998). Legislatures increased their staffing power especially for fiscal matters, 




importantly the budget (Ransone 1979). Thompson (1987) suggested that the enhanced role of 
and increased number of legislative and administrative personnel gave rise to state-level 
“subgovernments” (Thompson 1987; 765) that facilitated the development of stronger 
management of relationships between between the governor and the legislators. Through changes 
to both executive and legislative roles, the powers of the legislature and the governor in the 
policy making process became more evenly matched (Ransone 1979).  
Amidst these changes, scholars began revisiting the work of Sharkansky (1968) to 
empirically evaluate the shifts in power between legislatures and legislators. A 1980 study by 
Moncrief and Thompson copied Sharkansky’s methodology and found that legislatures deferred 
to gubernatorial budget recommendations under unified party control of the legislature, but broke 
with the governor’s recommendations when the legislature had split party control. Thompson 
(1987) also used the Sharkansky methodology for data from 1978-1980 and found that governor 
influence in budget affairs was declining. A caveat to these findings is that Thompson and 
Moncrief (1980) used four of the same states in Sharkansky (1968) and seven new states, while 
Thompson (1987) used eight of  the states in Sharkansky (1968) and ten new states. Thompson 
(1987) used seven of the states in Moncrief and Thompson (198) and eleven new ones. The lack 
of overlap across states across all three studies means it is impossible to determine if the 
differences in these results are due to actual changes across time in the influence of governors, or 
due to changes in state samples (Dometrius et al 2013). Clarke (1997; 1998) also followed the 
Sharkansky approach with 1985-94 data and found that governor influence in budget affairs 
legislative had not declined overall, but notably was restricted when the legislature had split 




The roles of governors and legislatures has potentially undergone another transformation 
since these changes. Abney and Lauth surveyed state legislative and executive budget officials in 
1982 and 1994 about their views regarding gubernatorial and legislative influence on state 
budget, and found that between the two time periods, the number of budget officials citing the 
governor as most influential dropped, concluding that gubernatorial dominance over state 
appropriations had ended in the late 1990’s (Abney and Lauth 1998). Thompson (1987) 
concluded that legislatures are less yielding to governors than they were in the mid-1960’s. 
While gubernatorial influence underwent a significant decline in budgetary politics since 
Sharkansky’s seminal 1968 study, governors still play an important role in short-term budget 
decisions, but legislatures were taking a more affirmative role in budget expansion (Thompson 
1987).  
Abney and Lauth (1998) suggest that lowered gubernatorial dominance over the budget 
process by the end of the twentieth century has resulted from several factors: first, legislative 
reforms leading to governors' losing the ability to control the appropriations agenda. Second, the 
line item veto has not given governors the ability to protect their executive budget. Third, greater 
party division between the legislature and executive branch have increased legislative resistance 
to the governor’s agenda. Fourth, states have not adopted reforms guaranteeing the independence 
of the executive budget (Abney and Lauth 1998). But in contrast to these findings, Dometrius 
and Wright (2010) found no consistent decline in gubernatorial budget influence, finding instead 
that on average governors maintained or slightly increased budgetary influence over the 
legislature between the 1980’s and 1990’s (Dometrius and Wright 2010).  In summary, there is 
no clear answer as to the power dynamic between the legislature and the governor regarding the 




 The role and behavior of a governor is often in contrast with that of the legislature. 
Governors have a different constituency than state legislators do, even though both governors 
and legislators serve the same state (Barilleaux and Berkman 2003). The governor is the only 
official in the process who represents the entire state (Wallin 1998). While state legislators must 
pay attention to the needs and wants of their “local geographic constituencies" (Crain and Miller 
1990), governors instead must consider the needs and wants of a "larger and more diverse” 
statewide constituency (Crain and Miller 1990: 1030).  This leads them to them to pursue 
different kinds of policy objectives (Crain and Miller 1990; Dometrius and Wright 2010). 
Legislators are incentivized by the need for reelection to pursue policies that provide targeted 
benefits to just their smaller, relatively more homogenous constituents. Taken as a whole, state 
legislatures can be expected to distribute state spending and benefits in such a way that will 
enhance incumbent reelection prospects (Lewis et al 2015). In contrast, the constituencies of 
governors are larger and relatively less homogenous, and therefore governors prioritize policies 
that will affect those across the state rather than just one area (Lewis et al 2015)  These broader 
constituencies incentivize governors to pursue policies that will grant more collective benefits, 
such as increased spending on statewide policies designed to arrest the negative social and 
economic effects of the opioid abuse epidemic, whereas legislators may be more interested in 
such policies specifically for their district (Crain and Miller 1990). Barrilleaux and Berkman 
(2003) argue that governors implement higher levels of spending for redistributive programs that 
benefit their constituencies, based on their personal policy preferences, and therefore governors 
therefore do affect state policy making in systematic and theoretically predictable ways based on 
their personal policy preferences.  




stemming from different constituencies, but must cooperate heavily in order to pass a budget. 
The budget is one of the most significant state-level expressions of public policy (Ransone 
1979).  Governors will take the lion’s share of public blame or credit for the overall financial 
health of the state, but legislators can securely sacrifice certain individual policy preferences as 
long they are able to gain certain financial and service benefits for their constituencies that will 
help their chances for reelection (Dometrius and Wright 2010). Both suffer the political 
consequences when a budget is unable to be passed, in comparison to other types of legislation.  
Legislators are obviously not obligated to pass a governor’s proposed policy bill. 
Governors are at the mercy of the “legislative monopoly” on policy passage (Kousser and 
Phillips 2012; 30) in every policy area other than the budget. If the legislators feel their 
constituencies will permit the continuation of the status quo as it stands without the governor’s 
proposed policy change, the status quo will persist, unless the governor is willing and able to use 
political maneuvering to negotiate passage of the policy (Kousser and Phillips 2012). However, 
in the case of the budget, if the legislature and governor cannot come to an agreement to pass the 
policy, “political calamity” (Kousser and Phillips 2012; 30) will strike. A late budget will 
typically trigger a government shutdown, and generate unfavorable public opinion and press that 
puts political pressure on governors and legislators to accomplish a compromise. A late budget 
can cause serious plummets in the approval ratings of legislators and governors (Kousser and 
Phillips 2012). These negative consequences are well known and therefore put pressure on both 
branches of government to come to negotiations before the clock runs out and a budget becomes 
late. In contrast to other types of proposed policies by the governor, constituencies and 
legislators cannot live with the status quo if no budget is passed. Therefore the advantage the 




(Kousser and Phillips 2012). Kousser and Phillips (2009) also suggest that the loss of a 
governor’s advantage and the increased bargaining power of legislatures is to be expected most 
when a state has a long legislative session and a professional legislature that can patiently “stand 
up” to the governor over a longer period of time (Kousser and Phillips 2009). The relationship 
between the governor and the legislature enters a special dynamic when concerning the budget.  
 The budget itself, and the governor’s control over it, has economic power in the sense 
that it determines real life financial and social consequences for recipients of a myriad of 
government services, taxpayers, and businesses, but it also contains symbolic power. Anton 
(1967) argues that the public has been taught to believe that there is someone in charge of the 
government and therefore there is reason for every government action. The budget document 
itself has symbolic value as it reassures the public that these civic beliefs are valid (Anton 1967). 
The budget becomes popularly and symbolically identified with the governor, who is viewed as 
the “someone” in charge of the state government (Anton 1967). Anton (1967) argues that the 
specific allocations listed in the budget and the logic behind the figures are not as important for 
the public perception as the fact that figures exist at all is, as their existence implies that the 
governor’s office has spent time and energy calculating a specific monetary figure, furthering the 
validity of the assumption that someone is in charge and there is a reason for every government 
action (Anton 1967). The budget has political power not just as a document that presents a 
roadmap for policy, but also for its symbolism of what the governor is paying attention to.   
Previous research asserts that governors have unique and identifiable policy preferences 
which can be identified within their proposed budgets (Barilleaux and Berkman 2003). These 
preferences for the policy agenda and state budget can also be located in the governor’s state-of-




traditionally delivered to a joint session of the legislative chambers at the same time the governor 
releases their formal proposed budget, is an opportunity for the governor to communicate their 
policy preferences (Clarke 1998). The state-of-the-state address functions to publicize the 
governor’s view of the top issues facing the state and the governor’s personal policy priorities for 
the upcoming year. It is also one of the most publicized speeches, publicized to not just the 
legislature but to the public as well. Regardless of what specific policies are proposed, it sets the 
stage for what issues the governor plans to talk about most throughout the year, which shapes the 
public discourse regarding their policy proposals and governor performance. The speech primes 
the public to receive and discuss future specific policies to deal with the most pressing issues. 
The governor’s choice to place an issue in the state-of-the-state gives it weight, credence, and 
publicity. If an issue is not talked about in the state-of-the-state, the governor is signaling that he 
or she will not be giving it public prioritization in the upcoming year. The speech affords 
legislators a glimpse into the upcoming political battles and lets the legislature know exactly 
what the governor is seeking (Kousser and Phillips 2012). The state-of-the-state address focuses 
legislators on the governor’s agenda and can put pressure on legislators into taking action 
(Kousser and Phillips 2012).  
There exists a long standing tradition of using of the state of the state and budget 
addresses in empirical analyses similar to my methods. Previous studies have used specific word 
appearance in the state of the state addresses, but to measure governor ideology (Coffey 2005) 
and governor political orientation (Weinberg 2010). Kousser and Phillips (2012) studied the rate 
of implementation of policies mentioned in the governor’s state of the state addresses, and found 
that out of the 1,088 policy proposals suggested in the studied state of the state addresses, forty 




enacted in some form of compromise. Combining the pass and compromise categories, 
governors executives successfully got at least some of what they want, as seen in these speeches, 
in approximately six out of every ten proposals, leading the researchers to conclude that 
governors are modestly more successful bargainers than legislatures (Kousser and Phillips 2012).  
Gosling (1991) analyzed changes and continuity in gubernatorial policy priorities 
between 1970 and 1990 to determine the extent to which governors can use budgeting power to 
advance policy priorities across states and time. By using the state of the state address and the 
budget address from fourteen states from the period of 1970 to 1990 and ranking the five most 
important policy priorities put forth by each governor, judged by order in the speech, theme, 
language, length of attention, concrete policy plans, and explicit statements of importance, the 
study concludes that governors use their state of the state and budget speeches to set their policy 
agendas, and that there are measurable trends over time in popular policy topics. 
ii. Methods 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, there is variation between the six New 
England states across the six policies recommended by the National Safety Council to respond to 
the opioid epidemic. The personal policy preferences and therefore policy agendas of governors 
are difficult to quantitatively measure, but I contend that the issues that the governor chooses to 
focus on during his or her state of the state and budget addresses are those that the governor 
considers most pressing for the state at the time. These speeches provide the governor an 
opportunity to introduce his or her preferred policy agenda and proposed policy solutions. The 
issues that the governor prioritizes the most will be explicitly named by the governor most often. 
This is an objective measure, as it does not take into account the details of the policy suggested 




pressing problems to be addressed by their administration. The total number of times a governor 
uses key words related to opioids will serve as the independent variable in my regression. 
I have elected to use the budget allocation for the state agency responsible for substance 
abuse treatment as a measure of state budget allocation towards opioids, though this should not 
be interpreted as the only way a state spends on the opioid crisis. The state agencies responsible 
for coordinating substance abuse treatment and prevention strategies are typically housed in a 
larger department—such as human services, public health, or mental or behavioral health. These 
agencies license and work with networks of local treatment providers and organizations; create, 
implement, and adjust prevention and treatment programs; and make sure that state residents are 
able to access services. Additionally, they oversee spending of state and local funds for substance 
abuse disorder treatment, the federal Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant, 
and Medicaid funding earmarked for substance use disorder treatment (Urahn et al 2015).  The 
need to respond opioid epidemic has permeated so deeply across many departments, such as 
departments of public safety for increased police attention to drug trafficking and overdoses, 
departments of justice for opioid addiction treatment during incarceration and handling the influx 
of charges associated with drug dealing and overdoses, legislatures needing to spend time on 
regulatory laws, departments of health for the creation of PDMPs, and departments of children 
and families to handle cases where parents have lost custody due to opioid convictions or 
children orphaned after their parents have died of overdoses. Trying to parse out all of the 
different aspects of where allocations are going across multiple departments for specifically 
opioid-related issues was not realistic due to lack of specificity of public records on budget 
allocations per department and office. The percentage of the budget allocated for the agency 




I hypothesize that the relationship between the number of opioid-related words in a 
governor’s speech and percentage of the budget dedicated to the agency for substance abuse 
treatment is positive. The more opioid-related words that appear in a speech should indicate a 
higher proportion of state budget allocated to substance abuse treatment. The relationship 
between prioritization in the speeches and the percentage of state budget allocated to substance 
abuse treatment will tell us about the policy agenda setting power of governors to shape the fiscal 
policy response in the department responsible for substance abuse treatment to the opioid crisis 
and can potentially help explain why New England states, while suffering problems of the same 
magnitude and with similar geographic and demographic challenges, enact different policies.  
 To obtain data for the prioritization of the issue of opioids in state of the state and budget 
speeches, I used the available transcripts of every state of the state and budget address given in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine between 1997 
and 2018. I chose to begin in 1996, the year of the introduction of OxyContin, to capture how 
often governors used the words in question before the reports of increased instances of opioid 
abuse began in the early 2000’s. In each speech I searched the transcript for the presence of 
seven words: “opiate,” “opioid,” “addiction,” “heroin,” “fentanyl,” “treatment,” and “overdose.” 
These seven terms presented a wide range of terms commonly and narrowly associated with the 
opioid epidemic. For each speech used, I aggregated the number of instances of each word’s 
usage to get a total number of words per speech variable, which served as the independent 




Figure 9: Use of Opioid-Related Words in Budget Speeches
 













The number of opioid-related words present in a speech does not account for the total 
prioritization of the issue within the speech, so I used two speech related control variables to 
account for a more nuanced measure of prioritization in a speech within my regression model. 
The number of times a particular word related to an issue is stated, how early on in a speech it is 
mentioned, and how long the governor speaks about the issue is a more holistic approximation 
for the governor’s prioritization of an issue. Previous scholars assert that governors place the 
issues they deem most important earlier in the speech (Gosling 1991). So I also looked to see 
how far into the speech these opioid-related words first appeared to create a rank variable, 
indicating how many topics the governor introduced before speaking about opioids. If the speech 
transcript included a formal organization of issues, I counted each heading as one issue and 
counted to how much headings it took for the governor to bring up opioids. If the transcript did 
not include an official organizational structure of headings, I read through the speech speech and 
counted the specific topics and thematic sections to create a ranking of issues within the speech. 
In doing this ranking, I did not include the governor’s rhetorical introduction or explanation of 
the budget structure as the first topic, instead beginning the rankings with the first individual 
policy or issue mentioned.  
I also accounted for the length of the governor’s opioid discussion within the speech, 
counting how many words appeared surrounding each instance of the key seven words regarding 
the issue of opioids. This measure of length should provide clarity as to if the governor is simply 
mentioning the opioid epidemic briefly in passing, or if he or she is proposing a detailed policy 
regarding some facet of the crisis that takes a longer time to explain. If mentions of opioids 
appeared multiple times in a speech, the measure of length is an aggregate marker of total words 




appeared, but not in the context of opioids. In these cases, I reported the ranking measure and 
length measure as both zero.  
To obtain budget allocation data for substance abuse agencies in each state for each year, 
I used the general appropriations act as passed for each fiscal year from 1997 to 2018. I used the 
appropriations figure originally passed for that fiscal year without adjustments, as I was 
interested in capturing prioritization in the moment in what appropriations were passed and 
signed closest to the governor’s speech, rather than the adjustments made in the second half of 
the fiscal year after more time had elapsed.  








Table 12: Average Budget Allocation for Agency Responsible for Substance Abuse Treatment 
By State 
 
State Average Budget Allocation for Agency 








In addition to controlling for the length of the governor’s discussion of the opioid 
addiction epidemic, and for where the opioid addiction epidemic appeared in the ranking of the 
issues present in the speech, I also controlled for year, state, the party of the governor, whether 
the governor’s party also controls the legislature, and the presence of the line item veto in the 
governor’s formal powers. I used an OLS regression model of:  
Percentage of Budget = Words + Rank + Length + State + Year + Governor Party + Party 
Control + Line Item Veto 
Using this model, I performed two separate regressions, one using data on word usage, 
issue rank, and issue length from the state of the state addresses and the other using data on word 
usage, issue rank, and issue length from budget addresses. I did so in order to avoid double 
counting the percentage of budget allocated for the office of substance abuse in the same 
regression, as the two sets of data for state of the state addresses and budget addresses included 





Table 13: Relationship Between Opioid Addiction Epidemic Prioritization within Governor’s 
State of the State Addresses and Percentage of State Budget Allocated to Agency of Substance 
Abuse Treatment 
Constant 30.59  
(18.80) 
Words 0.00  
(.01) 




CT 1.98  
(.15) 
ME -.24   
(.17) 




RI -.26*  
(.14) 
Year -.01  
(.01) 
Democrat Governor -.23**  
(.11) 
Governor Party in Control 0.03  
(.12) 








Table 13: Relationship Between Opioid Issue Prioritization Within Governor’s Budget 
Addresses and Percentage of State Budget Allocated to Agency of Substance Abuse Treatment 












MA  .14   
(.20) 
NH  -.06  
(.17) 
RI -.27   
(.25) 
Year  -.01  
(.01) 
Democrat Governor  -.25  
(.20) 
Governor Party in Control of State Gov’t -.19 
(.22) 










In this thesis I have discussed the variation in state policy responses to the opioid crisis in 
New England states. I contended that the variation of New England state policy responses to the 
opioid epidemic can be partially explained by the prioritization of the issue by state governors, 
theorizing that there is a positive relationship between a governor’s prioritization of the opioid 
crisis within in his or her policy agenda, and the percentage of the state budget allocated for 
opioid crisis response programs and policy initiatives. In order to analyze this, I used the number 
of times a governor used seven key opioid-related words in state of the state and budget speeches 
as a proxy for the prioritization of the issue by the governor, and the percentage of the budget 
allocation to the state agency responsible for substance abuse treatment as a proxy for the 
percentage of the state’s budget dedicated to responding to the opioid crisis.  
With words per speech as the independent variable and percentage of the budget as the 
dependent variable, I hypothesized that the relationship between the prioritization of the opioid 
epidemic in a governor’s speech and percentage of the budget dedicated to the agency for 
substance abuse treatment should be positive. The more opioid-related words that appear in a 
speech, spoken earlier and in more detail, should correspond to a higher percentage of the state 
budget being allocated to the agency for substance abuse treatment.  
For both of my regressions, I used a .10 two tail test due to the small n and large standard 
errors present. For the regression using data from the state of the state addresses, I failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the the number of words related to the 
opioid addiction in the speech and the percentage of the state's budget allocated to the agency for 
substance abuse treatment. The regression using data from state of the state addresses did not 




of the opioid crisis in the governor’s speech (words, rank, and length), indicating that in state of 
the state addresses there is not a detectable relationship between prioritization of the opioid crisis 
by the governor within a state of the state address and the percentage of the state's budget 
allocated to the agency for substance abuse treatment. 
For the regression using data from the budget addresses, I rejected the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between the the number of words related to the opioid addiction in 
the speech and the percentage of the state's budget allocated to the agency for substance abuse 
treatment. Of the three variables relating to prioritization of the opioid crisis in the governor’s 
speech (words, rank, and length), rank was not statistically significant, indicating that the ranking 
of discussing opioids amongst other issues within the governor’s budget address has no or an 
undetectable effect on the percentage of the state budget allocated for the agency of substance 
abuse treatment. For the regression of the budget address data, the length of the governor’s 
discussion of the opioid epidemic is statistically significant at the .10 level with a p value of .090, 
and has a negative impact on the percentage of the budget allocated towards the agency 
responsible for substance abuse treatment. For a one word increase in the length of the 
governor’s discussion of the opioid addiction epidemic, there would be a -.001 decrease in the 
percentage of the state's budget allocated to the agency for substance abuse treatment, a low low 
magnitude of impact. While the aggregate presence of the seven key opioid-related words is does 
not officially meet the standard for statistical significance at the .10 level, the p value for this 
variable is .107, which is close to being statistically significant at this level and is sufficient 
enough to warrant discussion especially given the low n of this study. The number of key opioid-
related words in the budget address has a positive impact on the percentage of the budget 




in the number of key opioid-related words present in the budget speech, there would be a would 
be a .053 increase in the percentage of the state's budget allocated to the agency for substance 
abuse treatment. The magnitude of the positive impact of the number of words related to the 
opioid addiction in the speech on the percentage of the state's budget allocated to the agency for 
substance abuse treatment is higher than the magnitude of the negative impact of the length of 
the governor’s discussion of the opioid addiction epidemic, indicating that just using the key 
opioid-related words in the speech has a stronger positive impact on the budget allocation than 
the length of the governor’s discussion of the opioid crisis does.  
In conclusion, the prioritization of the issue of opioid addiction in the governor’s 
speeches does have a statistically significant impact on the percentage of the budget allocated to 
the agency responsible for substance abuse treatment, but only when looking at budget 
addresses. I suggest that an explanation for the lack of statistically significant results in the state 
of state addresses regression is due to the fact that these speeches are one of the first steps in 
working towards budget allocation, and the major impact of the governor’s prioritization of the 
opioid addiction epidemic instead happens in budget address, when legislators will more 
seriously consider a governor’s policy preferences as they get down to the brass tacks of  the 
budget negotiations. I argue that the mechanism at work here is not that the legislators care about 
the exact number of specific words spoken by the a governor opioid crisis, but rather it is the 
prioritization of the opioid epidemic by the governor, as measured by the number of times he or 
she says these words and for how long he or she discusses it, that influences the legislators on the 
budget, who are more likely to be receptive to this during the budget address. 
My results support my contention that governors are in a good political position to shift 




the opioid addiction epidemic in the governor’s budget address has a positive overall relationship 
with the percentage of the state budget allocated to the agency for substance abuse treatment. 
These results provide one explanation for why New England states, while suffering problems of 
the same magnitude and with similar geographic and demographic challenges, have enacted 
different policies in response to the opioid addiction epidemic (specifically in the case of 
substance abuse treatment) due to different levels of prioritization of the opioid addiction 
epidemic by governors in their budget addresses.  
This thesis adds to an extensive body of literature examining the role of governors in the 
budget process, and to my knowledge is unique in its use of words in the state of the state and 
budget addresses to examine the prioritization of a single issue by a governor within these 
speeches and the effect that prioritization has on budget allocation. This thesis adds to the body 
of literature dedicating to understanding how the opioid epidemic occurred and how it may be 
battled. The problem of opioid abuse affects far more than those people directly affected by 
opioid abuse, it negatively impacts a variety of social and economic factors. It is impossible to 
adequately capture in words the sadness of so many overdose deaths that creating dramatic gaps 
in the social and economic fabric of communities across New England, big and small alike. But 
the more that New England governors put this tragedy into words in budget addresses, we will 
hopefully see more funding dedicated to addressing this crisis through the state agencies 
responsible for substance abuse treatment.  
v. Limitations 
Not every state had the general appropriations act available for all years from 1996 to 
2018, and not every state had transcripts for the state of the state and budget addresses available 




abuse treatment, allocations are not further broken down into funding for opioid substance abuse 
treatment versus substance abuse treatment for alcohol and other drugs. Not all of the funding 
appropriated to the substance abuse treatment department will go directly to just opioid addiction 
treatment. Future studies should consider using more finely targeted data if possible, and should 
examine other types of spending related to the opioid epidemic, such as the criminal justice 
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